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ABSTRACT
KAZAKHSTAN: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY?
Tokhtarbayev, Ozat
M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun
September 2001
Thıs thesis focuses on the Kazakhstani way of transition to democracy.
After having analysed the history of Kazakhstan, the author examines social,
national, political and state structures, political leaders and international factors
have affected Kazakhstan’s transition to democracy. However, the thesis
encompasses future perspectives of the Republic and includes suggestions on
what should be done on the subject as well.
Keywords: Former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Democratic transition.
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ÖZET
Kazakistan: Demokrasiye Geçiş Mi?
Tokhtarbayev, Ozat
Master, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun
Eylül 2001
Bu çalışma Kazakistan’a özgü demokrasiye geçiş yolu üzerinde
yoğunlaşmaktadır. Tez yazarı, Kazakistan tarihini inceledikten sonra,
Kazakistan’ın demokrasiye geçiş yolunu etkileyegelen toplumsal, ulusal, siyasal
ve devlet yapılarını, siyasal liderlerini ve uluslararası etkenleri ele almaktadır.
Bununla birlikte, çalışma Kazakistan’ın gelecek perspektifleri de kapsamakta ve
konu üzerinde nelerin yapılması gerektiği ile ilgili önerileri de içermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri, Kazakistan, Demokrasiye
geçiş
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1INTRODUCTION
Democracy... Although this term may mean different things “depending on the
individual, ideology, paradigm, culture, or context”1, maybe, it has been the most
popular term of 20th century. I want to clarify the meaning of the term
“democracy” in the way adopted in this work, for its “changeability”. It was used
in the way defined by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset in
their “Politics in Developing Countries”:
The term democracy is used... to signify a political system, separate and
apart from the economic and social system to which it is joined. ...
[D]emocracy-or what Robert Dahl terms polyarchy-denotes a system of
government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and
extensive competition among individuals and organized groups
(especially political parties) for all effective positions of government
power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a “highly
inclusive” level of political participation in the selection of leaders and
policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major
(adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political
liberties-freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form
and join organizations-sufficient to ensure the integrity of political
competition and participation.2
The path to be followed in order to reach “democracy” has not always been easy
to cover and different countries have experienced different experiences before
reaching the aim, i.e. democracy. Some of them are still trying to reach it or have
                                                          
1 Diamond, L. et al (eds.). 1990. Politics in Developing Countries. Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc, 4.
2 Ibid, 12
2reached it partially (the term “pseudodemocracy” or “semidemocracy” is used to
describe such kind of political systems3).
Former Soviet Union countries are unique ones. The socialist past
provided them with well-educated citizens; literacy is at the highest level in the
world. But the cost of the lack of democratic experiences was high for them:
some turn their backs to democracy, like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did, some
after considerable time of authoritarian rule announced their commitment to
democracy accepting it as a universal value, like Kazakhstan, others are still in
chaos, e.g. Tajikistan.  All these cases require specific attention and careful
studying, since each of them has been shaped by many internal and external
factors – each case is original in the sense of democratic experience; but what is
the truth – especially Central Asian states have not been subjected to careful
examination. Many Western political scientists are aware of this: “The time is
clearly now ripe for a comparative study of transition from communism”.4 Also a
lack of case studies, especially on FSU (Former Soviet Union) countries’
experience of democracy confirms this statement.
It needs courage to state that Kazakhstan is a democratic state in a full
sense, actually it never was. Kazakh intelligentsia, mostly pro-governmental ones,
although define the existing system as authoritarian regime, seem it as a necessary
link between totalitarian past and democratic future.5 Although existing political
parties represent pro-governmental as well as oppositionist interest groups, leader
                                                          
3 Ibid, 20.
4 Ibid, 23.
3of the main oppositionist party (Republican People’s Party) Akezhan Kazhegeldin
is in “self-made exile” in England.6
Kazakhstan regained its statehood again in 1920, which was lost with the
abolition of the institute of khan in 1820s, as Kyrgyz7 (Kazakh) Autonomic
Soviet Socialist Republic within Russian boundaries. Soviet experience did a lot
for Kazakhs: industrialization was undergone, new schools, health care
organizations as well as higher educational institutions were opened, state
boundaries were marked etc.
However, what lied beyond seventy years of communist rule was
disastrous: mass collectivization in the 30s that led to a 40% loss of Kazakh
population; Stalinist repression; establishing of a totalitarian regime etc. All of
these factors have played very important role in the shaping Soviet as well as
Kazakh mentality. I think, this point should always be remembered, because
transitional processes towards democratic society which post-Soviet countries are
undergone are unique ones in historical, political, societal and economical
contexts and are dependent on the historical legacy of a considered nation(s). In
addition, world has never witnessed transition of a country from communism to
democracy before.
Nowadays independent multiethnic Kazakhstan is territorially the second
largest country in post-Soviet area and ninth - in the world thanks to Soviet
delimitation policies implemented in 1924. It has vast natural resources, but the
                                                                                                                                                             
5 See for example Zhusupov, Sabit. 2000. “Demokraticheskiie preobrazovaniyya v Respublike
Kazahstan: real’nost’ i perspektivy” (Democratic transformations in Kazakhstan: the reality and
the future). Tsentral’naiia Asiia i Kavkaz. 4: 24-40
6 See following chapters about the motives of his “self-made exile”.
4problem is how to sell them to world markets. For example, in the case of
petroleum, several pipeline routes have been introduced8 but few of them seem to
be feasible. Although Kazakhstani transitional (from central planned to market-
oriented) economy has faced with the serious problems such as slow privatization,
interruption of previous economic relations and building up completely new
market-oriented ones, government managed to overcome them, and in the year
2000 GDP rose by more than 10 percent first time after the collapse of the
USSR.9 Privatization completed by more than half.10 GDP per capita, based on
purchasing power parity is 3,200 USD (2000)11 which seems to increase in the
nearest future.
In addition, Kazakhstan is stable state in the political sense – what has
been the result of authoritarian rule, government members are appointed by the
President according to his own criteria which have always been the subject for
doubting.
In sum, current issues include: establishing of a democratic state,
speeding up market reforms, establishing stable relations with Russia, China and
other foreign powers; developing and expanding the country’s abundant energy
resources, etc.
                                                                                                                                                             
7 In the following the October Revolution of 1917 years the Soviets firstly misnamed Kazakhs as
Kyrgyzs and Kyrgyzs as Kara Kyrgyzs.
8 For example see Kubekov, Mikhail. 1997. “Problemy eksporta Kazahstanskoi nefti: pochemu
Kazakhstanu nuzhna energeticheskaya nezavisimost’?” (“Problems of exporting Kazakhstani
petroleum: why Kazakhstan needs energetic independence?), Tsentral’naiia Aziia i Kavkaz 9: 8-
35.
9 For more information see [http://www.worldbank.kz/content/econ_ind_eng.html]
10 See [http://www.ipanet.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/plink/factsheets/kazakhstan.htm]
11 CIA World Fact Book. 2000. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kz.html]
5This work tries to show the path towards democracy of the Kazakh
Republic. The main question to be discussed is: what are trends in democracy in
post-Soviet Kazakhstan? It is a case study on the concept of democracy adopted
by Kazakhstan: is it the Western style or something different?
A nation cannot be examined apart from its past since many historical
factors determine a nation’s “today”. Therefore, first part of the work is devoted
to the history of the Kazakh nation: how the Kazakh nation was formed, how it
became the Russian subject, what were major changes during the Soviet era, and
what significant events took place in post-Soviet period – these are topics that
briefly discussed in this part. However, this part did not encompass all historical
developments of the Kazakh nation and tried to show the history of the nation in
general frames. Second part is about today’s Kazakhstan, its class, national, state
and political structures; development performance and international factors have
affected it. Third part is concerned with the future prospects of the Kazakh
Republic, where three possible scenarios of Kazakhstani future development are
examined; relevant suggestions are made and arrived at some conclusions on the
democratization project of the country.
In order to give a whole picture the author used sources in Kazakh,
Turkish, English and Russian focusing on primarily articles and books on the
matter. The author preferred to take into account reports provided by international
organizations such as OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe), HRW (Human Rights Watch), IFES (International Foundation for
Election Systems) etc where official information was needed.
6CHAPTER I
 HISTORICAL REVIEW
There are different views on the formation of the Kazakh nation. Some historians
claim that the Kazakh nation was formed passing three stages: (i) age of Turkic-
Mongol tribes and families, (ii) emergence of Eastern (Mongols, Buryats and
Oyrats) and Western (Tatars, Kazakh-Noghay-Uzbek, Sarts and Tajik) groups,
(iii) collapse of Kazakh-Noghay-Uzbek unity and settlement of Kazakhs in the
territory of present Kazakhstan, Noghays – in Northern Caucasia, and Uzbeks – in
Southern Turkestan as a result of tribal migration in the Great Steppe.  According
to this view, although Kazakhs appeared in the historical arena 15-16th centuries,
“independent history of Kazakhs” as a nation began only in the late 16th –
beginning of 17th century.12 Another view accepts Kazakhs as one of the old
nations whose ancestors were known in 5th century BC as alazons (who are
claimed to be ancestors of the Kazakh tribe alshyn) as described by Herodot.13
But the common view is that nomadic tribes separated from Uzbek Khan and
united under the leadership of Zhanybek and Kerey Khans in the middle of 15th
century became the Kazakh nation.
                                                          
12 Asfendiarov, Sandjar. 1993. Istoriia Kazakhstana (s drevneishich vremen) (The History of
Kazakhstan (from early times)). Alma-Ata: Kazak Universiteti, 94, 99
7Therefore, I prefer the common view, according to which the first
Kazakh State that was established in 1465 resulted in the formation of the Kazakh
nation uniting some nomadic tribes.
1.1 The First Kazakh State
According to this view, the process of the formation of the Kazakh nation was
completed in XIV-XV centuries.14 Kerey and Zhanybek Khans, who splitted from
Uzbek Khan, a successor of Dzhuchi Khan, established Kazakh Khanate in the
middle of the 15th century. Turkic tribes, such as Uysun, Naiman etc. who joined
under the Kazakh Khanate had become Kazakhs. However, scholars’ view about
the real meaning of the word “Kazakh” differs. Some think that it comes from the
Turkish verb qaz (to wander), because the Kazakhs were wandering steppemen;
others - that it is possibly the result of the joining of two Kazakh tribal names,
Kaspy and Saki. 15 Another “theory” has been put forward by well-known scholar
A. Zeki Velidi Togan, according to whom the term “Kazak” was firstly attributed
to Sultans and afterwards to tribes under the auspices of Sultans. The term was
used to characterise adventurers who separated from their traditional society and
tried to gain power from the outside of the society, generally using force. On the
other hand, Turkic tribes used to send armed adolescents to deserts or other
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Tynyshpayev, M. 1925. Materialy k istorii kirgiz-kazahskogo naroda (Materials on the history
of Kyrgyz-Kazakh people), Tashkent: Vost. Ord. Kirg. Gos. Izd-va. In  Asfendiarov, Sandjar.
1993, 98.
14 For example see Olcott, Martha. 1987. The Kazakhs. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
15 Ibid, 4.
8uninhabited areas to teach them how to survive; this practice was called
“Kazaklık”.16
From the beginning the Kazakh nation was consisted of three
associations – Great, Middle and Lesser Juz or Hordes. There are different views
on the formation of these three Hordes. One version related the formation to
geographical and “historical conditions of nomadic economy”.17  Kazakhstani
territory has three large natural regions suitable for cattle breeding, therefore
tribes had to choose one of them to feed their animals becoming members of one
of three associations. Another view explains the formation of three associations
by relating leaders of each Juz to different Chinghizids finding out direct
relationship between Dzhuci – his son Ezhen – Great Juz, Dzhuchi – his son
Tokai-Timur – Lesser Juz and Batiy – Middle Juz.18
In the 16th and 17th centuries, the territory of Kazakhstan was a political
formation divided into separate khanates, but without fixed territorial divisions.
The khanates, ruled by a khan, were a system of administration that was headed
by an elected judge or official called a Biy (see below for social structure of those
times). Khanates were made up of several clans. A sultan was the head of more
than one clan.
The 2nd half of the 16th century witnessed extension of the territory of
the Kazakh Khanate, as a result of need for additional territory to feed livestock.19
                                                          
16 Togan, Zeki Velidi. 1981. Bugünkü Türkili (Turkestan) ve Yakın Tarihi. İstanbul: Enderun
Kitabevi, 37.
17 Asfendiarov, Sandjar. 1993, 101.
18 See Tynyshpayev, Mukhamedzhan. 1925.
19 Pishulina, K. 1994. “Territoriia: qadym zamanindagy jane orta gasyrlardyng erte shagyndadagy
Qazaqstan jerindegi bolgan etnikaliq qybylystar” (The Territory: the ethnic events happened in the
9Borders of Kazakh khanates extended to the left bank of the Jayiq River in the
mid of 16th century. One of the successful Kazakh Khans – Esim Khan (1598 -
1628) established his control over Syr Derya region including the town of
Tashkent. Kazakhs migrated with seasons. Each clan had its own routes on which
other clans had no right to infringe. In terms of the seasons, the winter months
were the hardest. Livestock when unable to feed off the land because of severe
winter conditions, starved severely damaging nomadic economy. Eventually,
farming which employed methods of irrigation started again to develop in the
basins of the Syr Darya, Talas, Chu rivers and in other regions. From the late 18th
century, however, nomadic livestock continued to be a mainstay throughout the
territories.
Several khans played very important role in progressing the Kazakh
society, For example, the period of Qasym Khan (1455- 1518) witnessed
introduction of a new set of laws named the Qasym Hannyng Qasqa Joly (the
Straight Custom of Qasim Khan) that established “the rule of law” in the steppe,
the rule of Tauke Khan (1680-1718) was marked with compiling a code of rules
of common law - "Zhety Zhargy" (Seven Canons) which specified basic principles
of social law and social order as well as state structure.
   However, efforts towards political disunion in order to gain
independence made by certain khans and sultans, lack of internal market - all
these as well as other factors weakened the Khanate making it helpless in the face
of external enemies. In order to prevent Kazakh lands from enemy intervention,
particularly of Jungars’, whose raids into Kazakh lands become more frequent
                                                                                                                                                             
early and middle ages on nowadays Kazakhstani territory). In Kasymzhanov A,  Naribayev K, et
al. Qazaq, Almaty: Bilim, 47-65.
10
than ever in the beginning of the 18th century, Tauke Khan made an effort of
uniting three hordes but with a little success.
  The years of the war with Jungars were known in the Kazakh history as
"the years of the great disaster" ("Aktaban shubyryndy"). A decisive role in
countering the Jungar aggression was of All-Kazakh Congresses, where such
measures as forming volunteer corps, a unified front of defense to counter Jungar
raids were discussed. Indeed, All-Kazakh Congresses contributed to the formation
of the corps to a great extent which successfully challenged the Jungar forces
(1727 - at the river of Bulanty; an Anrakai battle in 1729). However, internal
disagreements paved the way to suffering a number of severe defeats that led,
according to common view to seeking protection of Russia.
After briefly explaining the political situation in the Kazakh Steppe and
main events happened before the Russian colonization the work will focus on the
societal structure of the Kazakhs of that times to complete a picture.
The traditional Kazakh society was based on nomadic values and divided
into two “classes” called “aqsuyek” – aristocrats (white bones) and “qarasuyek”
(black bones). First “class” was closed to representatives of the another one since
was a privileged one, only who were “tore” (descendants of Chinghiz or
Chinghizids) or “qoja” (missioners of Islam, who believed to be Arabs and
followers of A. Yassawi) could exercise privileges of this “class”.
“Qarasuyek” consisted of “biy”, “batyr”, “aqsaqal” and “the others”.
“Biy” were elites of this stratum; they were a kind of judges. “Biy” were, in
today’s words, a kind of self-made man, since every judge could not be titled as a
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“biy” by people, only who showed his superior abilities and talents in dealing
with problems was accepted as a “biy”. Every Khan had a respectful “biy” in his
palace, who played very important role in shaping Khan’s internal as well as
external policies.
Second group in “qarasuyek” “class” was consisted of “batyr”- military
leaders who proved their military abilities in a battle, therefore who were
respected according to their personal characteristics. However, the word “batyr”
sometimes was used for brave, gifted and experienced militants from “aqsuyek”
too.
Another group of this “class” was of “aqsaqal”s, who regulated all kinds
of social as well as political relations in the nomadic society. Kazakhs called
“aqsaqal” those who had intellectual capability and deep empiric knowledge on
various subjects.
“The others” were dependent and free men. Dependents were “tulengut”,
who served in a Khan’s palace, and “qul”, who were slaves, i.e. prisoners of war.
The institution of slaves was not widespread; “qul” could be seen only in the
houses of “aqsuyek” as a servants.
As we see, there was not clear distinction among some social groups of
“qarasuyek” since specific character of social development did not need deep
specification in carrying out social, military, political etc. functions, therefore,
formation processes of social institutions and stratum had a superficial character.
The main difference was between “white” and “black bones”.
According to Irina Erofeeva, a specialist on Central Asian nomads, Khan
was recognized as “primus inter pares” in contrast to neighbor states where ruler
12
was accepted as an absolutist one. Khan was known not as a charismatic
“superman” but as a “first among equals”. Such judgments of Irina Erofeeva were
based on oral literature of that period and information gained from stone
monuments of 18th-19th centuries.20
In everyday life, this kind of understanding of the institution of Khan
was materialized in closely established relations between “aqsuyek” and
“qarasuyek”. Representatives of “qarasuyek” could publicly criticize “aqsuyek”,
or give up relationship with one ruler and go under patronage of another one.21
One may claim that Kazakh nation has never exercised democracy. But
as we saw, some elements of democracy as pluralism and responsibility of the
ruler before his people were practiced in the traditional Kazakh society.
1.2 Russian Colonization
Why Abu’l Khair, Khan of the Lesser Horde, decided to join Russia? Some claim
that he wanted only military alliance with Russia, not total patronage of it, and
later was deceived by Tsaritsa. Others considered this process as an expansion of
the Russian Empire and as product of “conspiracy” between the Russians and the
Kazakh feudals.22  Thirds state that Kazakhstan did not join Russia voluntarily but
                                                          
20 Erofeeva, Irina. 1997. “Politicheskaya organizatsiia kochevogo kazahskogo obshestva” (The
politic organization of the nomadic Kazakh society). Tsentral’naiia Asiia i Kavkaz 12: 23-45.
21 Ibid, 39.
22 Asfendiarov, Sandjar, 1993.
13
was captured by force.23 Representatives of generally accepted view on the Lesser
Juz’s joining Russia, argue that Abu’l Khair requested Empress Anna Ioannovna
to become Russian subject in order to escape mainly from Jungar raids.24 A
representative of the last view, Olcott wrote in her book called “The Kazakhs”:
This agreement was mutually advantageous. To Abu’l Khair it
offered the possibility of improving his political position as well as of
increasing economic stability, for the Kazakhs and their neighbors saw
that Russia was the superior military force in region.(…) For Russia’s
part, the treaties with Abu’l Khair and those with the Khans of Middle
Horde (Semeke in 1732, Ablai in 1740) gave added security to the
fortified line along the Irtysh River.25
Beside security of the southern borders, this agreement created new opportunities
for Russian merchants as well by opening safeguarded doors towards the East.26
Notwithstanding what the real story was, Kazakhstan's joining Russia
implied incorporation, both peaceful and military colonization and a naked
conquest.
The year of 1732 highlighted formal incorporation of certain parts of the
Middle Horde’s territory by Russia. The oath sworn by a group of sultans and
elders of the Lesser and Middle Horde’s (Abu’l Mambet, Ablai) in 1740 stipulated
joining of only a part of the Middle Juz, but the wheel of Russian colonization
was fully on its way.
                                                          
23 “Canibek”. 1982. “Current Kazakh Language Publications in the People’s Republic of China,”
Central Asian Survey 2/3: 131-133.
24 For example, see Olcott. Marta. 1987.
25 Ibid, 31.
26 Hauner, Milan.1989. “Central Asian Geopolitics in the Last Hundred Years: A Critical Survey
from Gorchakov to Gorbachev”, Central Asian Survey 1, 1-19.
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Political and economic status of Kazakhstan in the middle and the end of
the 18th century featured the following: deterioration of internal accord in the
Lesser Juz; deepening of economic relations with Russia; development of barter
trade.
The second half of the 18th century is marked with the formation of
Ablai’s Khanate, the very person who was one of the organizers of effective
rebuff against Jungar aggressors. “Ablai was assuredly as astute politician”.27 He
pursued a policy of double citizenship - that of both Russia and China and was
“generally able to emerge on the winning side”.28 He played a very important role
in consolidating Kazakh feudal statehood.
By the beginning of the 19th century, Russia began to be concerned with
the governing of the Kazakh Steppe. Russia had interest in regulating local
relationships ”since Russian trade interests in the area had increased. (…) Trading
caravans to Persia, China, India, and the Central Asian khanates had to pass
through the Kazakh territories, but their safety could not be guaranteed”.29 In
order to solve it, Russia abolished the institution of khan and introduced a new
form of administration. After Bukey (1817) and Uali-Khan (1819) died, Russia no
longer appointed new khans. In 1822 by virtue of introducing the “Charter on
Siberian Kyrgyzes” Khan's power in Kazakhstan was officially abolished.
A new Russian system of administration was faced widespread protest of
the Kazakh population - that subsequently - expressed itself in a national-
                                                          
27 Ibid, 41.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, 57-58.
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liberation war of Kazakhs within the Russian empire. But leaders of Kazakh
liberation war like Mukhammed Otemis, Syrym Dat, Kenesary Kasym etc. did not
succeed in uniting regional revolts into a wide-spread one, therefore were
defeated. Colonization of major regions of North-East and Central Kazakhstan
was easied by the defeat of national-liberation war in the 20s -40s of the 19th
century.30
South part of Kazakh Steppe was a part of Kokand Khanate when
Russian troops put off moving towards southern borders of the Empire. Seizure of
Turkestan, Shymkent, Aulie-Ata and other settlements by tsarist troops in the 60s
of the XIX century, which required participation of quite powerful armed forces,
completed the conquest of the territory of the Great Juz by Russia. Thus all
territory of nowadays Kazakhstan came under Tsarist rule and starting from the
second half of the 19th century Kazakhstan represented a colony completely
shaped up by the Russian Empire according to its administrative system.
Further process of colonization was characterized as the intensification
of colonial forms of administering the Kazakh territory, the creation of military
settlements of Russia in the steppe. Between 1867-1868 Alexander the 2nd
performed another administrative reform.
Agrarian policy of tsarism implemented in the Kazakh Steppe in the late
of 19th century led to change of the proportion of nomadic and settled people.
Thus new forms of economies had emerged: a settled cattle breeding and a settled
farming economies. Social differentiation of the Kazakh society became clearer.
Economy was partly involved in market relations. Kazakhs, impoverished as a
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result of implementation of tsarist land policy31, had begun to work in various
industries that emerged in Kazakhstan in the last quarter of the 19th century. Local
merchants initiated a new trade practice - they started arranging fairs. Over the
last decade of the 19th century, some 482 km of railway lines were built.
Development of transit trade was also underway. In context of the Kuldzha Treaty
of 1851, trade links with China were based on a closer base. Usury and private
entrepreneurship had begun to be more common in the entire Kazakh Steppe.
By the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of Kazakhstan
constituted from the following regions: Syr Daria and Semirech’e (Turkestan
general-governorship with the center in Tashkent), Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk,
Uralsk, Turgay (Steppe general-governorship with the center in Omsk);
Mangyshlak – Transcaspian region; Inner (Bukeyev) Horde (in the Astrakhan
province).
Further colonization of Kazakhstan was closely related with the capitalist
practices that were relatively common in Kazakhstan at that time. It brought along
sharp class differentiation in the countryside, mass impoverishment, and
involvement of people in various industries. Naturally, protests as well as rebels
against colonial and social policies of the Tsarist regime became more widespread
than ever.
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First uprisings were of spontaneous and uncoordinated nature, though. In
1905-1907 some social-democratic groups were established (mostly on the
initiative of political exiles). The year of 1907 was known as a year of adoption
the "Law on election to the State Duma", result of which was depriving the
nations of Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan of their electoral rights. The
number of immigrated peasants from the inner Russia was growing since Tsarist
regime initiated this process in order to solve so-called “land problem”.
Consequently, Russian administration began to seize pasture areas from nomadic
cattle-breeding economies.
Colonial policy affected the living standards of the Kazakh people; cattle
breeding economy was in a crisis. Ever growing taxes and duties, land seizures
resulted in conflicts between Kazakhs and Russian peasants.
On the other hand, Russian colonization had changed the structure of the
Kazakh society. “Aqsyuek” that first was favored by Russian administration, had
lost their importance as a part of society, which would help to implement Russian
policies in the Kazakh Steppe since the middle of 19th century. Tsarist
administration began to prefer loyal individuals of “qarasuyek” instead.
“Biy” lost their significance in the eyes of Tsarist regime as well as lost
their importance in everyday life. In the second half of the 19th century whole
Kazakh Steppe was incorporated with Russia and, as it was mentioned above,
Russian administrative system was imposed. The Kazakh Steppe was divided into
6 regions (oblasts), each of them-into districts (uezds), the latter-into smaller
districts (volosts) and they into counties (auls). Oblasts and uezds were governed
by appointed  Russian administrators (gubernatory and uezdnye nachal’niki);
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administrators of volosts were selected from loyal to Russian Empire Kazakhs
and those of auls were elected by aul inhabitants among aul elders – aqsaqals.
Thus only “aqsaqal” continued to keep their status among Kazakhs; however,
their status was limited.
Nevertheless, the most affected group from joining Russia were those
who were in category of “batyr”. From the second half of the 19th century, with
the imposing Russian administrative system, batyrs had not existed any more as a
social group, their traditional military functions were transformed to
corresponding institutional structures of Russia’s colonial agencies.
The February revolution of 1917 in Russia was welcomed by the
population of Central Asia32, for indigenous population was suppressed by
colonial policy of Tsarism, which took extreme forms since the late 1916 when
Tsar issued decree calling indigenous population aged from 18 to 43 of the
Caucasian oblasts, Turkestankaya and Stepnaya gubernii for conscription into
labor brigades; “this was at a time when the Russian army was seriously
understaffed and the front was collapsing”33. This decree (ukaz) naturally was
resisted by Kazakhs. Resistance, which once was seen only in some parts of
steppe, turned into general uprising of indigenous population, which was
widespread and well organised.34 Although this uprising of 1916 was harshly put
down, the legitimacy of Tsarist regime was badly damaged.
In sum, political as well as social structure of the Kazakh society had
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witnessed significant changes due to Russian policies and reforms implemented in
the Kazakh Steppe. Russia was not interested in keeping political and social
structures of the Kazakhs alive, since Russia saw Kazakhs as a nation needed to
be “civilized”. It is generally accepted that Russian colonization policy was
different in the Central Asia than in other parts of the Empire in the sense that
Russia did not prefer to assimilate Kazakhs as well as other nations of the Central
Asia in a full sense. For example, Russia did not try to change religion of
Kazakhs, as it did in the Siberia. Russians, including immigrated peasants, tried to
be introduced as representatives of a “civilization”. Russia was believed to fulfill
her Mission Civilisatrice in the East.35
1.3 Alash-Orda Government
Inevitably, insufficient and discriminatory social and economic policies of the
Tsarism had created prerequisites for a national movement. Nevertheless, the
Kazakh intelligentsia, educated in various Russian institutions, tried to change the
existing situation, to liberalize the Kazakh society. Guided by such principles they
had become adherents of the Constitutional Democratic Party (KADET) of Russia
at the beginning of 1900s, since KADET suggested liberal reforms to be
undertaken in Russia.
The Kazakh elite got political experience in the Russian school of the
political thought and was affected by its ideals, therefore the fact that the elite had
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become politicians who tried to consolidate traditions of the Kazakh society with
the principles of western democracy was not surprising.36
However, by the year 1917 Kazakh intelligentsia had no more sympathy
for KADET since their views differed in several issues.37 It is worth pointing out
their main differences because it will help us to understand their principles as well
as mentality: (i) right of self-determination (KADET safeguarded the principle of
only cultural autonomy, whereas Kazakh elite’s aim was establishment of
autonomous Kazakh state within Russia: “Russia should be democratic federal
republic”38); (ii) secularism (KADET emphasized that religious and state affairs
had to go hand in hand, whereas Kazakhs wanted them to be separated from each
other); (iii) land problem (KADET put forward the idea of private ownership of
the land, which was, according to the Kazakh leaders not acceptable for the
Kazakh steppe).39
Having understood that national interests could be protected only by
their own the Kazakh intelligentsia proposed establishment of the Party “Alash”
during the First All-Kazakh Congress in Orenburg in July 1917. According to
prepared program of the party only in a democratic society and in the frames of a
legal state, a society would be in harmony. The Program of the Party “Alash”
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emphasized the importance of free elections and of presidential form of
government, freedom of press and freedom of associations.40
Thus the Party “Alash” was a representative of the idea of organizing
socio-political life in accordance with western democratic values. However, this
did not mean undermining of the relations with Turkic and Islamic countries.41
October Revolution was not favored by “Alash” leaders, since they were
not persuaded by Bolsheviks’ populist ideas. On December 5-13, 1917 in
Orenburg they convened the second All-Kazakh Congress that announced
formation of an autonomy called "Alash" and of a government represented by a
"provisional people's council" named "Alash-Orda”. Among Kazakh intellectuals-
organizers of the Kazakh autonomy, we can emphasize names of Alikhan
Bokeykhanov, Mir Zhakyp Dulatov, Ahmet Baitursynov, Mustafa Chokay,
Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpayev etc.
Upon the overthrown of Tsarism, Bolsheviks started organizing Soviets
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Kazakhstan, too. It went on hand in hand
with the emergence of bodies of old regime: all sorts of "executive committees",
"civil committees", regional or district commissars appointed by the Provisional
Government. Therefore, it was a period of dual power in the country.
Victory of the February revolution and the development of revolutionary
movement during the year 1917 triggered a tendency when various strata of the
Kazakh society came to actively participate in politics, in setting up all sorts of
political, professional and youth organizations. Thus, some followed the banner
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of Bolshevism and Socialist revolution; others the banner of the "Alash" to
uphold the idea of shaping up a Kazakh national autonomy within the framework
of a bourgeois-and-democratic Russia.
There were other parties such as “Ush Juz” (Three Hordes) and “Shura-i
Islam”. But they did not play a significant role in the political life of the Kazakh
society, as “Alash” Party did.
To sum up, the unique chance to establish independent Kazakh statehood
under the leadership of “Alash” elite was not realized, partly because “Alash
Orda” had not enough financial resources in order to implement its own policies.
Other reasons are seem to be as follows: (i) “Alash” was not supported by masses;
(ii) Kazakh intelligentsia had not exact program of how to express their political
demands. Alash was established in 1917, and it was too late since Bolsheviks
began to gain respect among masses due to their populism and discipline; (iii)
regional differentiation impeded the formation of the national unity.
Representatives of different regions had not same opinions on some issues such as
timing of declaration of independence, the position of minorities etc. To put
shortly, Party “Alash” tried to adopt and implement democratic values in the
Kazakh Steppe but was not successful. What is important, the existence of such a
liberal-oriented party in 1910s shows us that the ideas of a democratic society has
not been alien to the Kazakh nation since the beginning of the 20th century.
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1.4 Joining the USSR
1.4.1. The Initial Years
1.4.1.1. The General Trends
During the period between October 1917 and March 1918 Soviet power was
established mostly in cities and other more or less significant settlements of
Kazakhstan. However, this process was not simply one, since the process of
establishment of Soviet Power in most of the Kazakhstani countryside was
completed only near the end of the Civil war, when Bolsheviks could send troops
to pacify units of “Alash Orda”.
In March 1919 VTsIK (All-Russia Central Executive Committee) of the
RSFSR announced amnesty to the “Alash Orda” members, after that Turgay
group of the "Alash-Orda" headed by A. Baitursynov decided to support Soviet
power which stimulated “Alash-Orda” members’ decision to work on the side of
Bolsheviks. An Autonomous Kyrgyz (Kazakh) SSR within the RSFSR was
formed on August 26, 1920.
The economy of the country was virtually destroyed as the result of the
First World War and the civil war. Furthermore, a serious jut in the winter of
1920-21 resulted in the loss of more than half, and in some place as much as of
80%, of all livestock. On top of that, a poor harvest in 1921 resulted in famine.
Only by the end of 1928 had Kazakhstan’s economy recovered. All sectors were
producing in excess of the level of output of 1913 and industry comprised 21% of
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the GNP.42 The situation was partly recovered due to the new economic policy
that enhanced development of agriculture, but the recovery was not long standing
– the program was ended in 1924.
In the year of 1929, by the initiative of Stalin, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party discussed problems of the “development” of rural parts of
the USSR and decided to take measures on improvement the management of rural
restructuring, i.e. on speeding up the collectivization. A month later the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan issued a degree on settlement
of nomadic people in order to implement party decisions. The collectivization
proceeded in a rapid tempo. By February (1930) the percentage of collectivized
population was 35.3 percent and by March 42.1 percent.43 The intervention into
traditional nomadic life of Kazakh society and collecting livestock by the state led
to wide-scale tragedy never seen before in the Kazakh Steppe.
It is needless to say that as a result of such policies, the end of the 20s-
30s witnessed peasant uprisings to counter forced collectivization that resulted in
mass deaths of people.44 “Kazakhstani tragedy” - such is the name of this man-
made disaster in history.
In these years the economy of Kazakhstan underwent a rapid
transformation. Over the course of several years in the 1930s the focus of
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Kazakhstan’s economy changed from agrarian, to agro-industrial (1932), and to
industrial-agrarian (1938). The country was rapidly industrialising.45 By the 1941
the volume of industrial production had grown eight times compared to 1913.
Thus by the end of 1930s Kazakhstan was transformed into one with large-scale
and diverse industry, advanced crop-growing and animal husbandry.46
In December 1936 Kazakhstan was announced as a full member of the
USSR.
1.4.1.2. The Kazakh Soviet Apparatus
Former members of Alash Orda and the new Soviet activists among Kazakhs
formed the first Kazakh Soviet apparatus. Ex-Alash Orda members were
employed in educational and cultures spheres apart from political issues; they
never gained trust of the Soviet leadership. So, it is not surprising that the death
date of many of Kazakh intelligentsia, if not all of them, coincides with the end of
1930s, ie with Stalinist purges. Even Kazakh communists like Turar Ryskulov,
were victims of this Stalinist repression policy. As a result of widespread purges
the percentage of Kazakhs in the Communist Party dropped from 53.1 percent in
1933 to 47.6 percent.47
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It was clear that a new loyal Soviet apparatus, which was not supported
by local population, was needed in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the party began to
employ new members who had not any ties with “Alash-Orda” and whom could
be trusted. As a consequence, many of new members recruited in those years
were “who carried out the collectivization drive, with responsibilities far beyond
their training”.48
In sum, the`30s were the period of establishment of totalitarianism in
Kazakhstan that entailed massive political repression which led to “purifying”
Kazakh Communists from the ones with pre-revolutionary political experience
like old Alash Orda members as well as from ones who oppose central policies
like Turar Ryskulov.
1.4.2. The Hard Decades
1.4.2.1. The General Trends
Between 1939-1941 Kazakhstan was transformed into a major production base of
non-ferrous metals, coal and oil; it became a region of developed agriculture.
As a result of migration policy implemented by Stalin, about 800
thousand Germans, 18.5 thousand families of Koreans, 102 thousand Poles, 507
thousand people from North Caucasia were deported to Kazakhstan as well as
thousands of Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Kalmyks. Just during the years before
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World War II, Kazakhstani population was increased by 1 million 200 thousand
people deported from European part of the USSR.49
During the World War II, as many as 150 thousand people were sent to
Kazakhstan to work at military plants. On the other hand, 25 million people were
evacuated, principally to the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia; as a result of this
sudden influx, number of Kazakhstani cities grew up from 29 (1939) to 39
(1945), and the number of urban-type settlements from 53 to 100.50 Even
according to rough calculations undoubtedly Kazakhstani population during these
years increased at least by 1 million people.
This war costed to Kazakhstan too many lives. On the one hand, over
450.000 Kazakhstanis lost their lives in battlefields, on the other hand, the rest of
population remained in the countryside worked on two or three shifts providing
necessary for army goods.51
The end of 1940s - early 1950s were the years of recovery. The republic,
as well as other ones-members of the USSR, was recovering after the war
economy.
Another important policy effects of which, maybe, could be compared
only to collectivization of Kazakhs was the Policy of Virgin Lands of 1953-1965.
As a result of such policy, over 25 million hectares of land were planted with
cereal crops and over 10 million hectares are sown with forage crops annually in
                                                          
49 Ibid.
50 Bater, James. 1980. The Soviet City. USA: SAGE, 63.
51 Tatimov, M. 1994, 66
28
the late 1980s, which meant an increase of 422 percent and 806 percent
respectively since 1950.52
On the other hand, the Virgin Lands Policy affected the traditional
Kazakh livestock- breeding economy into a more scientific and centrally directed
type of animal husbandry. The project of settling new lands (“osvoyeniye tselinnih
zemel”) of North Kazakhstan initiated by N. Kruschev, brought about another 1.5
million people into Kazakhstani land53 – a fact that played an important role in
decreasing of the ratio of native population of Kazakhstan against other
nationalities.
Also during the 1950s the Soviet authorities established a space center –
the Baikonur Cosmodrome – in the East Central part of the Kazakhstan. In
addition, the Soviets created nuclear testing sites near Semipalatinsk in the East
and huge industrial sites in the North and East. The first testing of nuclear bomb
was carried out on 29 August 1949.
A new wave of Slavic immigrants flooded into Kazakhstan to provide a
skilled labour force for the new industries.  As a result of this policy, Russians
surpassed Kazakhs as the republic’s largest ethnic group, a demographic trend
that held until the 1980s.
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1.4.2.2. Soviet Policy towards Intelligentsia
Leaders of the Soviet Union wanted to “employ” loyal to “communistic ideas”
leaders among the indigenous population of national republics. The purges of the
late 1930s played a very important role in creating leaders that suit the Soviet
leaders’ wishes: ones who without any objection will implement the policy of the
Center, since all the old “national-bourgeoisie”, ie many members of Kazakhstani
Communist party with “doubtful” past, were executed as “people’s enemies”. The
Center never trusted in the local population, therefore, appointment of a Kazakh
to the position of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakh SSR
always followed by the appointment of a Russian as the Second Secretary and
vice versa.54 Nevertheless, generally, the process of creating loyal leaders among
the locals was successfully completed and the new generation of Kazakh
politicians that obediently implement Moscow’s directives was introduced.
During the implementation of the Virgin Lands’ Policy many members
of Kazakh party leadership were removed accusing of opposing this policy.
Brezhnev, who would become the First Secretary of CPSU, was appointed as the
Kazakh Party First Secretary. On the other hand, major industrialization drive
based on local natural resources and Russian expertise strongly contributed to the
urbanization of Kazakhstan, and at the same time it strengthened the Russian
dominance in the cities. This fact evidenced that although so-called new
generation of loyal politicians was created, the Center continued practising a non-
trust policy towards local leaders.
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1.4.3 Decades of Economic Revival
1.4.3.1 The General Trends
1.4.3.1.1 The Economy of Kazakhstan
The 1960s were the years when Kazakhstan was rapidly industrializing.  Only
between 1961-1965 the investment volume into Kazakhstani economy exceeded
total investment made in previous years of Soviet rule, thanks to which the
industrial capacity of the Republic doubled.55 The economy of the Soviet Union
was restructuring according to the principle of division of labour among 15 Soviet
republics, from which Kazakhstani economy was affected as well. Such spheres
of heavy industry as production of steel and iron, petrol and gas, chemical
industry and petrochemistry, etc could be shown as examples of rapid developing
sectors of that period. The number of big and small plants of heavy industry
constructed and began to function in the 1960s was 1174.56
As a result of this industrialization policy the industrial output of the
Republic surpassed agricultural one in 1970 and reached 48% of GNP.57 During
1970-1985 industrial potential of the Republic was slightly on increase, but
Kazakhstani industry was mainly consisted of extracting industry and Kazakhstan
lacked its own light and food industries, for example, nearly 60 percent of all
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(non-food) goods consumed in Kazakhstan was imported from other Soviet
republics.
However, the Soviet central planning system lacked efficiency. From one
five-year plan to another the Soviet leadership reported about gigantic plants
began to function in the Republic. The situation in Kazakhstan as well as in other
Soviet republics was determined not by high living standards of its people but by
the volume of investment, tonnes of extracted coal etc. The local problems were
solved by central authorities lacking any experience and knowledge on the matter.
Consequently, as a result of the insufficiency of the command economy, tempos
of development of the economy began to decrease. Average annual increase of
industrial production decreased from 8.4 % in 9th five-year plan (1971-1975) to
3.8 % in eleventh five-year plan (1981-1985). The growth of GNP was decreased
from 4.4 percent to 1.4 percent at the same period.58
The end of 1980s was characterised by shortage of food as well as other
consumer goods. The Centre failed to provide the Soviet people with everyday
goods such as bread, soap, tooth paste, detergent etc; shortly, system was in
turmoil.
Facing with such a crisis, Russia announced that on 1st January of 1991
the market economy would be introduced within its boundaries. Kazakhstan had
no other alternative but to adopt market relations too.
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1.4.3.1.2 The Kazakhstani society
1960-1970s were the years when Soviet policy to create “Soviet man” thought to
be successfully implemented. But as we will see later it failed to do so. Russian
language was becoming the main language of the Soviet people at the expense of
national languages. In the case of Kazakhstan, as many as 60 percent of Kazakhs
were fluent in Russian, whereas the number of Kazakhstani Russians who could
speak Kazakh language was less then 1 percent of the total Russian population of
Kazakhstan. 95 percent of books were published in Kazakhstan were in Russian
as well as 70 percent of TV programs translated in the Republic.59
However, Kazakh students made some efforts to change this situation.
For example, in 1963 Kazakh students in Moscow formed one of the first
unofficial young organization – civil society of Kazakh youth called “Zhas
Tulpar” (Colt), the number of its members exceeded 1000. Youth-members of
this group organised lectures, concerts and expeditions to different parts of
Kazakhstan, delivered their suggestions on existing problems of Kazakh society
to high officials.
Naturally, the officials’ reaction to the activities of this youth
organisation was negative, its activities were always under the surveillance of the
KGB. Leaders of “Zhas Tulpar” were claimed to be nationalists, therefore, the
end of 1960s was the end of “Zhas Tulpar” too. Many members of this
organisation (M. Auesov, M. Aitkhozhin etc) have played an important role in the
life of the Kazakh society.
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Another attempt of the Kazakh youth to put forward their interests was
“Zhas Kazakh” (Young Kazakh) of 1974-77; it would not be hard to guess that
this attempt was resulted in failure too.
1970s – the middle of 1980s was the period of repressing every kind of
thought different from “Soviet”, ie official ideology. It was not till the middle of
1980s when the values of democratic society, rights and freedoms to Soviet
citizens, which although were written in the Constitution never realised into life,
were introduced to the Soviet society by Gorbachev’s “perestroyka” and
“glasnost” policies.
The year of 1987 was a kind of starting point for the Kazakh NGOs
(non-governmental organizations). The main ones were “Initsiativa” (Initiative),
and “Obshestvennii Komitet po problemam Balhasha i Arala” (Public Committee
on the problems of Balkash and Aral), both of them focused their activities on
ecological issues. Further democratisation of society and deorganising of
administrative system based on central planning stimulated the establishment of
new non-governmental political organisations. The formation of “Nevada-
Semipalatinsk” anti-nuclear movement with broad mass support among
Kazakhstanis signed a new phase in Kazakhstani society’s life.
1.4.3.2 The Kazakh Apparatchiki
The “socialist” construction of the 1960s was faced with some problems related to
the central management of the whole Soviet economy. The Soviet leadership
wanted to bring the impossible into being: to unite administrative and economic
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methods of management. This policy led to strengthening of bureaucrats, to
backwardness in technological sense and to limiting of the self-management.
Additionally, economic development slowed down, the main reason of which was
limiting reforms only to economic sphere thus not touching the political although
attempting to unite both administrative and economic areas. Reforms did not
encompass the political structure, ownership principles, but carried on the
monopoly of the state ownership and rejected free market relations. Brezhnev and
his circle supported the old central planning system based on plans imposed to
related subjects (plant managers etc) from top without any consultations with
them.
In such conditions the ruling of the Republic was “given” to Kazakh –
Dinmukhambet Kunayev – who was the first Kazakh-member of Politburo and
close friend of L. Brezhnev. With coming of D. Kunayev to the power Kazakh
membership in the Communist party was increased as well as Kazakh
participation in the government (in 1964 only 33 percent of the members of the
Council of Ministers were Kazakh, by 1981 Kazakhs held 60 percent of the
posts60). Moreover, obkom’s (oblastnoi komitet partii – regional party committee)
first secretaries were appointed from local ones, and mostly from Kazakhs (before
Kunayev, the Soviet leadership was accurate at appointing to these positions
Russians outside of Kazakhstan. Later Kunayev wrote that
many times we discussed this theme: why the Center stubbornly appoints
as a First Secretary of Central Committee of the republic its own
“cadres” thus ignoring many talented local administrators? Such a cadre
policy has nothing in common with the Leninist principles. Moscow
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adopted imperial ambitions, which could be formulated as “We appoint
those whom we want“61).
We can call this process as Kazakhization of governmental structures of the
Republic, which formed a necessary base for the formation of the local political
elite. What is more, Kunayev used his position of the First Secretary of Kazakh
Communist party and of full member of Politburo to bring his supporters to
Moscow. Martha Brill Olcott claims that
there were ten Kazakhs on the Central Committee elected at the Twenty-
sixth Party Congress, including six obkom first secretaries and two
senior Russian officials from the republic apparat. At least five other
Russians on the Central Committee had long associations with
Kazakhstan and may well owe their subsequent promotions to
Kunayev.62
Here we should remember his close friendship with L. Brezhnev, on the other
hand, L. Brezhnev himself was not stranger to the Kazakhstani Communist Party
and this fact may play a very important role in the promotion of pro-Kunayev
apparatchiki.
The year 1983 was the turning point in Kunayev’s career since was the
year of the death of his mentor – L. Brezhnev. Next first secretaries of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, Andropov and M. Gorbachev were not so Kunayev-
friendly, with the exception of Chernenko who was not healthy enough to be busy
with D. Kunayev. Kunayev was seen responsible “for advocating the continuation
of the Brezhnev policy lines”63 which according to latecomer rulers of the USSR
was the policy that led to the stagnation of the Soviet economy. The years under
                                                          
61 Kunayev, Dinmukhammed. 1992. O moyem vremeni (On my times), Almaty, 100.
62 Olcott, Martha. 1987, 245.
63 Ibid.
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L. Brezhnev’s ruling were referred as “gody (or vremena) zastoya”, ie “ the years
(or times) of stagnation”.
Kunayev was replaced by Kolbin, Russian who had no experience with
Kazakhstani realities from Ulyanovsk district of Russia in December 1986. This
led to a large demonstration of Kazakh students in Almaty, which is known as
“Zheltoksan (December in Kazakh) Riots of 1986”. Moscow tried to show this
peaceful demonstration as a nationalistic, chauvinistic one, and officially marked
all Kazakh nation as chauvinistic. Demonstration was a kind of protest to the
appointment of Kolbin as a First Secretary, Kazakh students opposed not to his
ethnic background but to the general policy of the Center, its approach to the
matter. Kazakh youth made such a demonstration trusted in Gorbachev’s
“perestroyka”, “pluralism” and “glasnost” policies, but were threatened in a very
hostile way: the masses of Kazakh university students were dispersed by using
military force. The official figure given in “Pravda”, which was accessible only
after several years, was 60 deaths64 and many injuries. However, estimations of
death casualties were as much as 280.65 According to a very optimistic source the
number of jailed was up to a thousand. 66 This merciless reaction of the Center
showed once more the policy of Moscow toward democratization of the Soviet
society.
                                                          
64 Pravda, 19 December 1991. I think that the official figure of Kazakhstan was much more lower.
65 “Samizdat”. 1987. Central Asian Survey: 3, 73-75.
66 Olcott, Martha, 1987, 256.
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Kolbin had been on the position of the First Secretary for three years
when N. Nazarbayev, the Head of the Kazakh Council of Ministers of that time
was appointed as a new First Secretary.
1.5 After the Collapse of the Soviet Union
1.5.1 General Trends of 1990s
After the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union it became clear that the
political as well as economic grounds of the society had to be changed. Former
economic relations were broken; the republic faced crises in all spheres of societal
as well as economic life. The government was expected to take immediate
measures. As a way of dealing with these crises, government began to introduce
free market-oriented policies, which have been implemented in two stages: (i)
1992-November 1993 and (ii) November 1993-today.
Between 1992-1993 Kazakhstan was fully dependent to Russian Central
Bank’s monetary policies, to other social and economic policies which were
implementing in Russia.67
January 1992 has been associated with the liberalization of consumer
prices. Considerable difference between official and unofficial exchange rates,
and other factors led to high inflation (up to %200068). In the republic with the
population of about 17 million, the number of unemployed reached 40,514 in
                                                          
67 Berentayev, K. B. 1998. “Osnovniye etapy i resultaty reformirovaniia ekonomiki Respubliki
Kazahstan” (Main periods and results of reforming Kazakhstani economy), in Tsentral’naiia Asiia
i Kavkaz: 14, 88-97.
68 Detailed information on the inflation in Kazakhstan can be obtained from the Website
[http://www.nationalbank.kz/EconFinRep]
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1993, which was 4,031 in 199169. In the same period (1991-1993) social
stratification came about and real wage was gradually decreasing (See Table 1).
Table 1 Changes real in average wage between 1990-1993, (Ruble)
Indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993
Nominal wage 265.4 440.8 4625.3 63750
Real wage 265.4 238.5 265.1 228.5
Note: The year 1990 was taken as a base.
Source: Paramonov, V. V. 2000, 38.
Table 1 clearly shows that although nominal average wage was sharply
increasing in this period, real average wage decreased, and this was reflected in
living standards of population. High quality food products such as meat, dairy
products, and sugar were replaced by bread and made-from-flour products,
consumption of which were increased by %23 in 1993 compared to 1990.70
Table 2 Changes in nominal average wage in Kazakhstan between 1994-1998
Indicators 1994 1994 1996 1997 1998
Nominal average
wage*
1725.7 4786 6840.9 8541 9682
Nominal average
wage**
48.4 78.5 101.64 113.2 123.6
Source: Paramonov, V. V. 2000, 177.
*Tenge
**US Dolar
In November 1993 national currency called Tenge was introduced, which
led to adoption independent fiscal and monetary policies backed by IMF and
                                                                                                                                                             
69 Paramonov, V. V. 2000. Ekonomika Kazakhstana (1990-1998) (Kazakhstani economy [1990-
1998]), Almaty: Gylym, 38.
70 Ibid.
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World Bank, and to laying the foundation of independent macroeconomic policy.
International financial organisations’ suggestions could be summarised as
follows: 71
- limitation of the role of a state in social and economic spheres;
- liberalization of foreign trade;
- liberalization of prices and wages;
- formation of necessary for development of the private sector conditions;
- rationalization of state expenses;
- minimization of the state budget deficit;
- formation of effective financial sector;
- implementation of consistent anti-inflationist policy.
The “mass privatization” program began in 1994. This program was
motivated not by economic reasons but by the principle of social justice. All
population, including children received equal amount of privatization coupons;
extra ones were given according to such criteria as employment record, living in
rural parts etc. Privatization coupons were expected to be invested by their
holders in investment funds. Investment funds, in turn, had to use coupons when
privatizing state enterprises.72 Thus, all population was considered taking a part in
privatization process. But this program ended with a failure, since investment
funds did not have sufficient financial sources and could not participate in
privatization. Moreover, an investment fund could buy maximum 20 percent of
shares of an enterprise.
                                                          
71 Berentayev, K. B. 1998, 88-97.
72 Half of a price of a state enterprise’s shares had to be paid in money and other half in
privatization coupons.
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During 1992-1995 more than 15,000 state enterprises were privatized,
about half of which were small-scale ones.73
In July 1994, implementation of a new anti-crisis policy was begun, the
aim of which was reaching macroeconomic stability at the end of 1995. After its
implementation ended a new governmental program encompassing the formation
of a market infrastructure, new fiscal and monetary policies, liberalization of
foreign trade and privatization has been consistently implemented. As a result of
this program state budget has been reduced at the expense of social security and
other expenses. The first steps taken towards formation of a strong bank system
and a securities market, development of insurance sector, low inflation rates were
among other consequences of this program.
Generally, macroeconomic indicators have been improved as a result of
this program. According to data provided by the National Bank of Kazakhstan,74
in 1996 GDP increased by 0.5%-it was the first positive result since the year
1991. Inflation rate was decreased to 11.2 percent in 1997 from 60.3 percent and
28.7 percent in 1995 and 1996 respectively. State budget deficit was decreased
from 3.9 percent of GDP to 3.6 percent in 1997 (-3.7 in 1998). (See Table 3)
In 1997 the percentage of GDP increase was 1.7 percent, but decreased
in 1998 by 1.9 percent due to crises in Russian economy. In 1997 industrial
output increased by 4% (-2.1 in 1998), whereas investments by more than 20.2%
(12.8% in 1998). (Table 3)
                                                                                                                                                             
73 Ibid.
74 All data on macroeconomic indicators was provided by the national bank of Kazakhstan. For
more information see Website
www.nationalbank.kz/EconFinRep/Show_tb101.asp?From=01.01.1993&To=01.04.2001
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Table 3 Macroeconomic indicators (1994-2000)
GDP
change, %
Industrial
output
change, %
Inflation
rate, %
Investmen
t change
%
Budget
deficit or
proficit, %
Wage
change,
%
1995 -8.2 -8.2 60.3 -43.0 -4.0 16.7
1996 0.5 0.3 28.7 -39.9 -2.6 18.1
1997 1.7 4.0 11.2 20.2 -3.7 16.4
1998     -1.9 -2.1 1.9 12.8 -3.7 6.1
1999 1.7 2.2 17.8 3.8 -3.5 –
2000 9.6 14.6 9.8 29.4 0.1 19.2
Source: www.nationalbank.kz/EconFinRep/Show_tb101.asp?From=01.01.1993&To=01.04.2001
It is seen that in the year of 2000 all indicators regarding economy of
Kazakhstan were positive. But economic stability was reached at a high cost. In
the period between 1994-1998 the number of unemployed reached 1 million,
whereas population was significantly decreased and totalled 15.5 million75. On
the other hand, in these years consumption of food products was gradually
decreased76.
These market-oriented policies resulted in disproportion of incomes, ie.
inequality among Kazakhstani population, which was not so sharply seen before
reforms.
                                                          
75 Paramonov, V. V. 2000,163.
76 Statisticheskii Ejegodnik Kazakhstana za 1994-1997gg (Statistical Yearbook for 1994-1997).
1998, Almaty.
42
     Table 4 Distribution of reel income among Kazakhstanis (after taxation), (%)
Monthly
income per
person  Tenge
Total
population, %
Urban
population, %
Rural population,
%
1 2 1 2 1 2
Up to 1000
1001-3000
3001-4000
4001-10000
10001-19000
Over 19000
20.6
42.1
11.8
21.8
3.0
0.6
20.6
41.9
12.4
21.8
2.9
0.4
11.9
39.6
14.3
29.5
4.0
0.7
6.8
36.7
17.2
34.0
4.7
0.6
31.9
46.2
8.4
11.4
1.6
0.5
35.5
47.9
7.2
8.5
0.8
0.1
       Note: 1-December 1997, 2-December 1998.
       Source: Paramonov, V. V. 2000, 179.
It was clearly stated in Table 3 that in 1998, %62 (whose monthly
income is lower 3000 Tenge) of the total population was below poverty line.
Moreover, this percent is higher in rural area than in cities, what has also
contributed to social differentiation among population.
The transition to a market economy in Kazakhstan has been associated
with increased inequality and stratification. Living standards have fallen for the
majority of people, unemployment and poverty have been high, the distribution of
assets and earnings has changed radically, and social benefits have fallen. The
social distance between the ”winners” and the ”losers” of the reforms has
widened dramatically.
Moreover, radical changes in the economy and the society coincided
with reforms taken place in governmental apparatus as well as in state
institutions.
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1.5.2 Developments in the Political Arena
1.5.2.1 The President
Since Kazakhstan may be characterised as semi-presidential system and president
has played very important, if not the major, role, in the introduction of all kinds of
reforms, first, I would like to mention developments concerning the institute of
presidency. The institute of presidency that was formed on April 24, 1990, was a
principal step taken towards structural reforming of the state system. This step
was caused by some objective and subjective reasons related with economic,
political and ideological circumstances of that period. On 22 October, 1989,
amendments to the Constitution of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, which
would make transformation of the state system into presidential one much easier,
were made: the powers of the Supreme Soviet were limited and the principles,
which the election system was based on, were changed etc. These were the first
steps taken in order to establish legal state.
As it was mentioned before, at the beginning of 1990s the Soviet Union
faced with crisis encompassing whole existing political, social and economic
system of the state. In that hard times, the search for a new constitutional organ,
in order to learn the elements of “sovereignty”, to make structural changes in
political, social and economic areas and to materialize the state functions which
were not used before, was underway in many Soviet republics as well as in
Kazakhstan.
The Communist Party was loosing its monopolist role as a nucleus of the
state and this affected the whole political system. “Republic of Soviets” was
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enable to cope with the problem due to its large territory on the one hand and the
unwillingness of state organs and public servants to bear the all kind of
responsibility-on the other. In order to cope with these problems, a new strong
organ, which did not show its effectiveness in the past, had to be established.
Thus the institute of the presidency was established to fulfill this gap.
To shortly summarize these developments: the transition process of
Kazakhstan from the Soviet system into the new one based on the 1995
Constitution may be divided into four stages, as it was stated by Kazakh scholar
Malinovski.77 Furthermore, these four stages represent the developmental stages
of the political-juridical status of the Kazakh President. This classification is
based on the specific characteristics of the internal political system, the changes
of the organizational content of the state.
First stage – the Soviet Parliamentary Republic – was reflected in the
law “On the Organization of the Institute of Presidency in Kazakh Soviet Socialist
Republic” and in “The Amendments to the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR” as
“The Head of the Kazakh SSR is the President of the Kazakh SSR”.
Second stage – the Soviet Presidential System – began with passing the
law “On the Amendment to Constitution Related to the Status of the Head of the
State”. Article 144 was changed as: “The Head of the Kazakh Republic, its
highest executive and imperative organ is the President of the Kazakh SSR”.
Third stage – Parliamentary system with empowered the Supreme
Soviet – was related to the period of the implementation of the 1993 Constitution.
                                                          
77 Malinovski, Viktor. 1998. Glava Gosudarstva Suverennogo Kazakhstana (The Head of
the State of Independent Kazakhstan), Almaty: Print-S.
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Article 75 of this Constitution was stated, “The President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan is the Head of the State and its Highest Executive”.
Fourth stage – Fifth Republic – the period of the implementation of the
1995 Constitution. The third chapter of the 1995 Constitution is titled “The
President”. This chapter is placed just after norms related to human and citizen
rights and freedoms and is followed by chapters “The Parliament” and “The
Government”. Thus the importance of the Institute of Presidency among all other
organs of the state was emphasized.
1.5.2.2 The Formation of a Multiparty System
After mentioning developments concerning the institute of presidency, next focus
will be on the formation of the multiparty system in Kazakhstan. The year of
1993 played a significant role in the process of formation of multiparty system in
Kazakhstan. Coup attempt of August 1991 taken place in Moscow clearly showed
that Communist Party could not be the political basis of the republic, since it lost
its legitimacy and sympathy among Kazakhstani as well as other Soviet republics’
population. On the other hand, in the state that attempted to be a democratic,
system had to embody many parties. N. Nazarbayev, as the leaders of other
republics did, decided to form multi-party system at the expense of closing the
Communist party. His first attempt was the creation of the Socialist Party, which
inherited the property and the membership of the Communist Party.  However,
this party was not accepted by large masses as a new one since nothing changed
but the name. Anuar Alimzhanov became its first president.
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People’s Congress of Kazakhstan was the result of Nazarbayev’s second
attempt to create a party. This party was created in October 1991 and was in
accord with pro-Nazarbayev line. Olzhas Suleimenov and poet Mukhtar
Shakhanov were first party’s co-chairmen.
Nazarbayev decided to form another party in October 1992. The name
was chosen as The Union of People’s Unity for Kazakhstan. It was another
example of strong pro-Nazarbayev political entity. Its first president was Supreme
Soviet deputy Serik Abdrakhmanov, but in 1993 the leadership was passed to
Nazarbayev.
First new Constitution of Kazakhstan was adopted in 1993, which
envisioned a new legislature that was to be formed on a multi-party system base.
On the one hand – the crises of Soviets (Councils) of People’s Deputies’ as
representative organs, the need for a new legislature proposed by the new
Constitution – on the other, stimulated the holding first in the history of
Kazakhstan multi-party elections.
As a result, in October 1993, the Parliament passed laws “On Election”,
“On Provisional Empowering of the President and Local Administrators” (which
envisioned vesting them with extra powers including those of the legislature) and
decided to dissolve itself.
The situation on the eve of election campaign was characterised
by such social and political tendencies as:
high inflation, which partly was due to the introduction of national
currency;
systematic delays of wages, pensions and stipend payments;
activation of some groups among Slavic population as a result of
further breaking up relations with Russia;
dissolution of the Soviets that resulted in dismissing of hundreds
of  deputies;
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        the formation of party coalitions as well as other groups (as
official as well as unofficial) on the eve of general parliamentary
election.78
In general, parliamentary elections of 1994 were first multi-party elections in
which all political forces as well as independent candidates could participate;
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK) (ex-Communist Party of Kazakhstan),
People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (PCK) and Union of People’s Unity for
Kazakhstan were just some of them.79
Table 5 Party composition of the Kazakhstani Supreme Soviet following the
general election of 1994
Party/organization Seats % of
Seats
Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan
Confederation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan
People’s Congress of Kazakhstan
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan
Peasants’ Union of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Social Movement Harmony (LAD)
Organization of Veterans
Union of Youth of Kazakhstan
Democratic Committee for Human Rights
Association of Lawyers of Kazakhstan
International Public Committee “Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan”
Congress of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan
Deputies of the 12th Supreme Soviet
Independent candidates
Total
33
11
9
8
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
40
62
177
18.6
6.2
5.1
4.5
2.2
2.2
0.6
0,6
0,6
0.6
0.6
0.6
22.6
35.5
100.0
Source: OSCE Report on 1994 Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan, 1995.
According to the report of the Central Election Committee, out of
9,561,534 people eligible to vote, 7,030,050 or 73.52 percent participated in the
                                                          
78 Peruashev, A and Babakumarov, E. 1998. Noveishaya istoriia Kazakhstana (Newest history of
Kazakhstan), Almaty: Dauir, 78.
79 See Appendix C for more information about Kazakhstani political parties.
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elections. The national structure of the newly elected legislature was as follows:
106 Kazakhs, 49 Russians, 10 Ukrainians, 3 German, 3 Jews, 1 Uzbek, 1 Tatar, 1
Ingush, 1 Korean, 1 Pole and 1 Uygur.80
MPs of the Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan, Confederation of
Trade Union of Kazakhstan and the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan in the new
parliament formed fractions. Remained MPs formed 14 deputy groups based on
professional affiliations.
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) criticized
1994 parliamentary elections for rescheduling of elections81 and irregularities in
registering Russian candidates. Other criticisms of the CSCE towards the
elections were: fraudulent ballots; simultaneous voting for several candidates;
restriction of the opposition’s access to media; and insufficient preparation time
for political parties, movements, and candidates, drawing “a categorical
conclusion that … [the] elections … were accompanied with an array of most
flagrant violations in the procedure for a free expression of people’s will and …
should be recognized as invalid”.82
Responding to these criticisms the Electoral Commission stated that
although the elections may not have conformed well to Western standards, they
were in line with current Kazakhstani legislation.83
                                                          
80 Brown, Bess. 18 March 1994. “Kazakhstan Election results”. In RFE/RL News Briefs, Munich:
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc:12, 8.
81 According to the legislation parliamentary elections were to be held in summer 1995, but firstly
were rescheduling for December 1994, and later to March 1994.
82  “Further Election Criticism”. 9 March 1994. Moscow: ITAR-TASS. In Daily Report: Central
Eurasia. 9 March 1994. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, p. 34.
83 “Further Election Criticism”, 9 March 1994, 34-35.
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Although some sources report that at least 60 percent of the newly-
elected parliamentarians are reliable supporters of Nursultan Nazarbayev, and “…
will, therefore, be able to control the majority in line with Nazarbayev’s
wishes”84, in reality the new parliament proved to be adopted oppositionist
position. Parliamentary opposition led by deputy group “Progress” was quick to
be organized immediately after the elections, and offered alternative program of
economic development called “New Economic Policy”.
In May 1994 the Parliament passed a vote of no-confidence in the
government of Sergei Tereshenko, who was appointed as prime-minister at Soviet
times. This meant an apparent confrontation with the President. Nazarbayev,
backing by the Constitution, which gave him the right to name the prime minister,
subject only to parliamentary confirmation, ignored the vote for a time. His main
argument was that privatization process had to be completed by the existing
government.
But the Parliament continued to make pressure overriding the
presidential veto on some bills. Moreover, nonparliamentary opposition called
“Respublika”85 began to demand replacement of both the prime minister and the
president.
                                                          
84 “Final Results of Parliamentary Election Issued”. 17 March 1994. Moscow: ITAR-TASS. In
Daily Report: Central Eurasia. 18 March 1994. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 43.
85 “Respublika” brought together the Socialist Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the new
Communist Party, the Lad (Russian nationalists), the Azat (Kazakh nationalist party) and the
Tabigat (Greens). It prepared alternative program of economic development, it differed from the
official one in many aspects but the main feature was the rejection of IMF recommendations,
which would lead to “societal catastrophe”. For more information see: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2
April 1994.
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In October 1994, the Parliament managed to force Nazarbayev to accept
the resignation of the Tereshenko government. Some scholars have argued that
the acceptance of the resignation of the government was nothing but a good
maneuver made by the President, since socio-economic situation in the country
was still deteriorating and the President needed the scapegoat, who could be
charged as the main responsible person for this deterioration.86
In late 1994, the legislature began to see itself as the main brake on
presidential power. Speaker of the Parliament, Abish Kekilbayev, a close
associate of the President, became increasingly insistent that government actions
and decrees must have a basis in law. On the other hand, he also began to insist
that normal democratic practice is to have the parliament propose new legislation,
rather than the President (as stipulated by the Constitution). Shortly, he believed
that the suitable political system for Kazakhstan is parliamentarianism.
However, the opposition (parliamentary and nonparliamentary) believed
that the replacement of the prime minister was a part of Nazarbayev’s tactics and
saw the only way in the election of the new president. Some independent
newspapers began to actively discuss possible presidential candidates, among
whom the most prominent were Olzhas Suleimenov (the People’s Congress of
Kazakhstan which announced itself as constructive opposition in autumn 1994),
Serikbolsyn Abdildin (the Head of the “Respublika” and of the Communist Party
of Kazakhstan) and Ghaziz Aldamzharov. The opposition agreed on supporting
Olzhas Suleimenov as presidential candidate in the next presidential elections
                                                          
86 Karsakov, Ilyas. 1998. “Osobennosti transformatsii politicheskoi sistemy Kazakhstana v kontse
80 – v seredine 90 godov” (Features of the tranformation of Kazakhstani political system at the
end of 80s-mid of 90s). Tsentralinaiia Asia i Kavkaz:14, 45-68.
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scheduled for December 1996, which was seen as the only way of gaining power
in the republic.
Nazarbayev understood possible outcomes of such an oppositionist
position well, what was complicated by the decreasing rating of Nazarbayev at
the expense of increasing ratings of O. Suleimenov, G. Aldamzharov and A.
Kazhegeldin because of further deterioration of economic conditions.87  
Whereas the opposition was focused on the next presidential election, the
President went before the Parliament on March 11, and told them that they were
an improperly assembled body, so were to be annulled as well as all passed laws
including the decisions given by the government. President’s decision was backed
by the decision of the Constitutional Court given on March 6 and reaffirmed on
March 11 on the sue of Svetlana Kvyatkovskaya who was a candidate but could
not become a MP due to, according to her, the fact that the voting had violated the
Constitution. She sued to have 1994 election in her (Almaty) district to be
annulled, but the case was interpreted as casting doubt on the legitimacy of the
entire parliament.
MPs reaction was not effective. Several deputies began a hunger strike.
O. Suleimenov attempted to convene alternative “People’s Assembly” but the
building of the Parliament was closed due to “necessary restructuring”, so they
had to meet on the street.88
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Having annulled the Parliament, N. Nazarbayev tried to find the
appropriate way to solve the problem. The Constitution did not contain any rules
for a situation when the legislature as well government was annulled; it did not
provide any suitable mechanism to overcome existing political crises. Thus, the
law “On Provisional Empowering of the President and Local Administrators”
dated October 10th, 1993, was accepted by the President as provisional action till
the new legislature would be convened, which was to happen only after adoption
of the new constitution, since the old one proved to be ineffective.
On the other hand, Nursultan Nazarbayev convened an “Assembly of
Kazakhstani People” of his own, at the end of March, although the Constitution
did not contain any article giving the right to the President to do so. The
Assembly of Kazakhstani People adopted a resolution for Nursultan Nazarbayev
to stay at his post till December 2000 without election, which was backed by the
will to avoid an anarchy in the country. Nazarbayev, although was not against
such an idea, decided to put the matter to a national referendum.
The referendum was held on April 29, 1995. The results of the
referendum were as follows: 91.3 percent of all eligible to vote peoples
participated, and 95.8 percent of whom used their votes supporting the extension
of the presidential rule.89
The referendum emphasized the tendency towards centralised semi-
presidential power and disappointed supporters of establishing parliamentarism.
In this context, it can be claimed that dismissing of two parliaments within very
short period of time may be explained as an outcome of “struggle” between
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supporters of semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism, which has been seen in
many post-communist countries experiencing transition towards democratic
regimes.90
The political events following the referendum revealed organisational
and financial weakness of the opposition, which was represented by Azat, Lad,
the Communist party of Kazakhstan, Labour Movement, Tabigat. It prepared its
own project of the new constitution but it lacked time and finances to carry on
propaganda of its constitutional concept. The opposition succeeded only in
presenting their draft to the President; it opposed the balance of power envisioned
in the official project and was to be accepted by the legislature.91
Within the very limited period of time the project of the new constitution
was prepared and presented for public discussion (the time allowed for discussion
was only a month). Many political parties and organizations such as the Socialist
Party, the People’s Cooperative Party, the Party of People’s Unity, the People’s
Congress of Kazakhstan, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party,
Confederation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan made supportive
commentaries on the new constitution.
The referendum on the new constitution was held on August 30, 1995.
The voter turnout was 91 percent. 89.1 percent of all voters voted for the adoption
of the new constitution.92 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan has set
a semi-presidential regime. According to it, the President is not belonging to any
                                                          
90 See Özbudun, Ergun. 1993. Demokrasiye geçis sürecinde anayasa yapımı (Constitution
Building in the Transition Process to Democracy). Ankara: Bilgi.
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of legislative, executive and judiciary powers. He is above all of them and
considered to be neutral. He appoints all high officials in the country including
judges of high courts. Prime minister, who forms government according to
presidents’ rules, is subject to president’s appointment too. The Parliament is
bicameral and consists of the Senate (upper house) and the Majilis. Senate had 47
members who were elected by indirect voting through local representative bodies
(since the number of regions was decreased from 19 to 14 because some regions
were united the number of senators was changed), two from each of 19 regions
and Almaty city. The President appoints 7 Senators; moreover, the Head of the
Senate has been subjected to the Presidential nomination. The Majilis had 67
representatives (now it has 77, due to amendments made in the legislation), one
from each district drawn to have roughly equal population. Generally speaking, it
could be claimed that the new constitution is a rough imitation of the existing
French Constitution, what is not surprising since the draft of the constitution was
prepared with the assistance of French specialists.
After adopting the new constitution the new legislature had to be elected.
The elections were held in December 1995 with turnout of 79.5 percent.
About 30 political parties, movements and organizations registered their
representatives but only 15 of them succeeded in getting their candidates into the
parliament. (See Table 6)
 Table 6 Party representation in the parliament of Kazakhstan, December 1995
Party/organization Seats
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55
Majilis
     People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (PCK)
     Peasant Union
     Youth Union
     Lawyers’ Union
     Confederation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan
     People’s Unity Party (PUP)
     Union of Entrepreneurs
     Nevada-Semipalatinsk Social Movement
     Social Fund for the Assistance of Victims of Natural Disasters
“Komek”
     People’s Cooperative Party (PCP)
     Engineering Academy of Kazakhstan
     Club of Creative Workers and School Principals of Aktobe
     Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK)
     “Revival of Kazakhstan” Party (RKP)
     Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK)
     Independents
Senate
     Raion Maslikhaty (District Councils)
     City Maslikhaty (City Councils)
     Independents
     Appointed by the President
67
1
7
3
1
5
24
1
1
1
1
3
1
12
1
2
14
47
34
2
4
7
Note: The total number of party-nominated candidates elected to the Majilis was fifty-one. Several
deputies were nominated by more than one party/organization.
Source: Vesti Kazakhstana, December 30. 1995.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), while
calling the elections fair, has declined to give Kazakhstan’s electoral system a
“democratic” imprimatur.93
 The bicameral parliament elected in 1995 was not like the previous one
in terms of opposing government’s and president’s policies. The fact that the
President may dismiss the Parliament at any time plays very important role in
“pacification” of the Parliament. On the other hand, some oppositionist parties
like “Azat” boycotted the elections because they considered the Presidential
Decree “On Elections” as an illegal document, since it was adopted in the absence
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of the legislature.94 Moreover, all candidates had to pay a sum equal to 100
minimum wages (then it was about USD 600) in order to be registered as a
candidate. This fee would not be returned notwithstanding whether candidate won
the elections or not. This factor paved the way to withdrawing of many
representatives of the opposition from the elections. In addition, as it was
mentioned above, the President appoints 7 Senators, and nominates the Head of
the Senate, thus strengthens his own power in the Senate. These and other factors
affected the structure of the first bicameral parliament of Kazakhstan.
The opposition viewed the elections and the new structure of the
parliament mainly as vehicles for Nazarbayev to legitimise his authoritarian rule.
Oppositionist parties and movements formed the opposition movement “Azamat”
which was registered in 1996. It held its first congress in April 1996 where a
coordinating council of 49 members and three co-chairmen (Murat Auezov –
Kazakhstan’s former ambassador to China, nowadays the Head of “Soros-
Kazakhstan” Foundation, Petr Svoik – the Socialist party leader and the former
chairman of the State Committee on Pricing and Anti-Monopoly Measures, and
Turegeldy Sharmanov – a member of Kazakh and Russian academies of medical
sciences) were elected.
In November 1997, several oppositionist party and movements convened
the first session of a joint coordination committee on creating a union of
opposition forces, where opposition activist Galym Abylseitov was elected as the
chairmen. The organization, which was called the People’s Front of Kazakhstan,
and included the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Workers’ Movement,
                                                                                                                                                             
93 For more information see the Website [www.freedomhouse.org]
94 Olcott, Martha. 1997, 241.
57
LAD, Azamat, and Azat, was officially established in February 1998. Its main
goal was to nominate a candidate for presidency in the next presidential elections.
Azamat co-chairman Petr Svoik was elected as First Deputy Leader, and
Chairman of Workers’ Movement Madel Ismailov was named Deputy Chairman.
However, 17 pro-Nazarbayev party and movements, including the
Democratic Party, People’s Cooperative Party, and the Muslim Women’s Union,
responding to the attempts of oppositionist parties and movements to create a
national front, signed a memorandum on cooperation with the government
supporting Nazarbayev and his reforms in January 1998.
 Short-term benefits of establishing “the regime of limited pluralism”
were stabilising the country’s economy as well as inter-ethnic relations. In 1996,
GDP of the country increased first time after the independence. Banking system
restructuring was successfully completed. However, the positive developments in
the economy coincided with negative practices in the field of political rights. (See
Table 7)
Table 7 Freedom ratings in Kazakhstan, 1992-2000
1992-
93
1993-
94
1994-
95
1995-
96
1996-
97
1997-
98
1998-
99
1999-
00
Political
Rights 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Civil
Liberties 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Status PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF
Note: Combined scores of civil and political liberties, each rated on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being
freest and 7 least free. A score of 5 and less (with a 2 on political rights) is regarded as “free”, 6 to
11 as “partly free” (PF), and 12 to 17 as “not free” (NF).
Source: Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1991-1998, in
www.freedomhouse.org
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In September 1998 President Nazarbayev addressed the nation a speech
“On the Situation in the Country and major Directions of Domestic and Foreign
Policy: Democratization, Economic and Political Reform for the New Century”.
He stated that Kazakhstan must become a supporter and symbol of democracy
and human rights. Seven fundamental elements of democracy were outlined:
• The electoral process must be honest, representative and encourage the fullest
participation of candidates and voters.
• The role of parties in the political system must be strengthened.
• It is necessary to strengthen and to provide autonomy for the Majilis and
Senate to have stability and the succession of power.
• The role of non-governmental organizations in building a civil society must
be strengthened.
• An independent judiciary is a pillar of a democratic society.
• It is necessary to build on the already established record of a free, uncensored
and independent press.
• Changes in attitudes to women must be made by increasing women’s
representation in all branches of authority.
The President also stated that authoritarianism of any kind in Kazakhstan
is the road to nowhere. Only a free democratic society will be a guarantor of a
stable and happy life. The contents of the speech encouraged widespread support
for further democratisation.
In October 1998 the two chambers of the Parliament agreed in a joint
session on a series of constitutional amendments which included changing the
term of office for the President from five to seven years; deleting the age limit of
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65 for the President; removing the requirement for a 50 percent turnout for a valid
election; and establishing the line of succession in case of the early resignation,
removal or death of a President. One day later, the Parliament called early
presidential elections for 10 January 1999. Thus, the presidential election was to
be held almost two years earlier than planned.
Since no public discussion had taken place on this issue, the Parliament’s
decision caught the opposition parties and possible presidential candidates by
surprise. Various groups questioned the legitimacy of the amendments to the
Constitution and the election call. The Constitutional Council decided that the
constitutional amendments were legal.
On November 30, 1998, the Central Election Committee formally
registered four candidates: Nursultan Nazarbayev, the incumbent President;
Engels Ghabbasov, a member of the Senate; Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the chairman
of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; and Ghani Kasymov, a chairman of
Kazakhstan’s custom committee. These candidates were able to present the
required number (170,000) of signatures in support if their candidacy, to pay a
registration fee of USD 30,000 and to pass a test in Kazakh language.
 Other candidates voluntarily withdrew (Kharishal Asanov, and
Zhaksybay Bazylbayev) or were denied registration due to an administrative
sanction during the year prior to registration (Amantai-Khazhy Asylbek, and
Akezhan Kazhegeldin).
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, after having been banned from running for the
Presidency, embarked on organising a political party, the Republican People’s
Party (RPP), with the aim to participate in the Parliamentary elections of 1999.
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The RRP called on its supporters to vote for none of the existing candidates. The
founding congress of the RPP took place in mid-December 1998.
  Election campaign atmosphere, according to the Report of ODIHR
(Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) on the presidential
election, was in favour of only one candidate, ie the incumbent president. State
authorities did not behave impartially and provided support for the election of the
existing president. It is claimed that there was no differentiation between state
affairs and the incumbent’s campaign. For example, state bodies announced and
publicised their support for N. Nazarbayev, while printed messages encouraging
passengers to vote for him were distributed on some local flights of the state
airline. The report stated that administrative measures were taken towards some
candidates’ campaigning. For example, candidates had uneven access to public
spaces.
 On January 10, 88.3 % of all peoples eligible to vote participated in the
election. According to the Central Election Committee, the majority of votes were
given in the support the incumbent president. (See Table 8)
Table 8 The Results of the Presidential Election, January 10, 1999
Candidate Votes, % of total
Nursultan Nazarbayev
Serikbolsyn Abdildin
Ghani Kasymov
Engels Gabbasov
79.8
11.7
4.6
0.8
Source: Web-site of the Central Election Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
www.election.kz, RFE/RL Newsline
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The OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission95 found that the
election process did not suit the standards to which the Republic of Kazakhstan is
committed as an OSCE participating state. The areas of concern include the
following: duration of the election campaign, legislative framework, election
commissions, the infringements on rights of citizens to seek public office,
obstacles to freedoms of association and of assembly, campaign atmosphere,
access to the media, voting procedures.96
Next general elections were held in October 1999 according to the new
law “On Election” passed on May 6, 1999. A newly elected bicameral legislature
took office in December 1999.
According to the law, the number of Senate members was reduced to 39
from 47 due to uniting some Oblasts97 (thus the number of them was decreased to
14 from 19). 32 members of whom are elected on the basis of indirect suffrage by
secret ballot at a joint session of the deputies of Maslikhats98 at each Oblast and
in Astana and Almaty (these two cities are of special status); the rest is appointed
by the President.
The Majilis has 77 members, the election of whom is based on direct
suffrage of adult citizens by secret ballot. It is a mixed system, with 10 seats
elected on the basis of proportional representation and the remaining 67 elected in
                                                          
95 ODIHR did not meet the Government’s request to send a presidential observer mission. In its
public explanation, the ODIHR cited concerns about the unequal opportunities of presidential
candidates, unequal access to media, and coerces support for Nazarbayev and sent small election
assessment team to report on the full election process.
96 The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 5 February 1999. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Assessment Mission, Final Report.
97 Oblast is the term for the level of regional administrative authority.
98 Maslikhat is the general term that refers to locally elected officials.
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single mandate constituencies. These rules were innovations of the new law “On
Election”, according to which each candidate listed on a party list must provide a
fee equal to 25 minimum wages; these fees are refunded to the party as long as
the party passes the 7% threshold of the total votes cast.
Candidates in the single-mandate races may be nominated by political
parties, by any other republican or local public associations or may be self
nominated. Under the Election Law, candidates cannot appear on a party list and
a ballot for a single mandate constituency at the same time.
Total 547 candidates were registered in the 67 single-mandate districts,
of whom:
• 80 candidates nominated by public associations99;
• 113 candidates nominated by political parties;
• 354 self-nominated candidates.100
In addition, nine party lists with 64 candidates were registered for party
list ballot.101
The Senate election took place on 24 October at joint sessions of
qualified electors with turnout of 86.5 percent. Lack of open or official affiliation
by candidates with political parties suggests that the Senate races were much
more a question of individual political personalities than support for or against
particular parties.102
                                                          
99 Public associations are every kind of NGOs except political parties.
100 The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 2000. OSCE/ODIHR Final Report
– Parliamentary Elections of 10 and 24 October 1999
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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Table 9 Political Make-up of the Majilis after 1999 Elections
Seats
Affiliation
Single member
districts
Party list Total
OTAN (Fatherland)
Civil Party
Communist Party
Agrarian Party
Republican People’s Party (RPP)
People’s Cooperative Party
Business
Government Associated
Others
Total
20
9
1
1
1
1
10
20
4
67
4
2
2
2
10
24
11
3
3
1
1
10
20
4
77
Source: The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 2000. OSCE/ODIHR Final
Report – Parliamentary Elections of 10 and 24 October 1999.
U.S. Department of State in its report on human rights practises in
Kazakhstan103 revealed many irregularities concerning the parliamentary elections
of 1999. Particularly it stated that, among other irregularities, there were
widespread allegations that some local authorities interfered with the
parliamentary elections during the campaign and in the voting process.104
Moreover, some reports claimed that tax inspectors and some KNB (Committee
of the National Security – ex-KGB) officials intimated opposition candidates,
their supporters, and the independent media.105 On the other hand, OSCE/ODIHR
                                                          
103 U.S. Department of State. 2000. The Report on Human Rights Practices in Kazakhstan. Full
text is available at the Website
["http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=798]
104 In one case, the chief election commissioner resigned because, according to him, the district
authority ordered him to deliver a victory for the authority’s favoured candidate.
105 Ibid.
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reporting on the elections of 1999 pointed out (i) executive authorities’ illegal
interference in the election process; (ii) unfair campaign practices by parties
closely associated with existing power structures; (iii) threats of bureaucratic,
administrative, and judicial measures jeopardising media operations; (iv) bias by
lower level election commissions for candidates and parties favoured by regional
and local officials; and (v) intimidation and obstruction of the electoral campaign
of opposition parties and candidates.106
Thus, the Parliamentary Elections of 1999 failed to be consistent with
OSCE election standards. However, Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections of
1999 marked a very significant step in the country’s transition to democracy.
According to OSCE/ODIHR, improvements in three areas created the potential
for Kazakhstan to meet OSCE commitments:
(1) The Central Election Commission adopted an extensive set of
regulations, significantly improving the legislative framework for the
election: (2) Ten political parties were registered for the party-list
election and 547 candidates for the single- mandate constituencies,
contributing to pluralism; and (3) party, candidate, and non-partisan
observers were accredited to monitor the proceedings in a great majority
of precincts (polling stations).107
After the election opposition parties have held a number of press conferences
concerning their views on the election. Opposition forces created a united front of
representatives of oppositionist political parties, human rights organizations, and
NGO (non-governmental organisations) called the Forum of Democratic Forces,
the founders of which were the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Republican
People’s Party, Political Alliance of Women’s Organizations, Ecological Union
                                                                                                                                                             
106 The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 2000.
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“Tabigat”, “Orleu”, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the
Rule of Law, “Pokoleniye”, “Azamat”, Association of Independent Mass Media
In Central Asia, Workers’ Movement and others. It adopted a resolution of a
series of demands, which include:
• an appeal to the Parliaments and Governments of the USA, Russia, japan, EU,
CIS, and OSCE not to recognise the deputies elected by means of widespread
falsifications to the Senate and Majilis;
• a demand that the election results in both the Senate and Majilis be declared
invalid;
• a demand to bring the members of the CEC (Central Election Committee) and
lower-standing election commissions to justice for the violations committed;
• a demand to conduct in the first half of 2000 new elections to the Majilis and
Maslikhats and also elections of Akims (regional governors, appointed by the
President) and judges at all levels;
• a demand to conduct in the second half of 2000 new elections to the Senate.108
It would not be hard to understand that none of their demands was taken
seriously and met. Nazarbayev in his speech addressed to the nation and made on
the eve of the elections warned Akims that they “must strictly adhere to the
principle of non-interference by executive authorities in the activities of parties
and candidates”. His expectations on the elections were “free and open,
                                                                                                                                                             
107 The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 2000.
108 Information on the Forum of Democratic Forces can be obtained from the Website
[www.forum.fsn.kz]
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transparent and competitive, monitored, accurately reported, and fairly
adjudicated”.109
In practise, the legislature exercises little control over the executive
branch, although it has the constitutional authority to remove governmental
ministers and vote no-confidence in the Government. The existing constitution
allows the executive branch to dominate the legislature. According to the 1995
Constitution, although the Parliament must approve the overall state budget, it
could increase state spending or decrease state revenues only on the approval of
the executive branch. Nearly all laws passed by Parliament originate in the
Government, which controls the budget of the Parliament; it has not provided
funds for MP (Members of Parliament) to hire staff, a situation generally viewed
as decreasing Parliament’s effectiveness.
Thus, the Constitution of 1995 fully established an autocratic political
system110 which, according to some pro-Nazarbayev scholars one day in the future
would transform into democratic one.111 In practise this means that the political
power has been consolidated in the hands of Kazakhstani President, who although
according to the Constitution of Kazakhstan, is very powerful, expanded his
presidential powers by decree, thus only he can initiate constitutional
                                                          
109 Statement by the President of Kazakhstan to the people of the country in connection with the
elections of October 1999. Full text is available from the Central Election Commission Website at
[http://www.election.kz/eng/Obracheniye/Obrach.asp]
110 Linz and Stepan showed defining characteristics of authoritarianism as follows: “Political
system with limited, not responsible political pluralism. Often quite extensive social and economic
pluralism… Often some space for semiopposition”. See Linz, J. and Stepan. A. 1996. Problems of
democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist
Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 44.
111 For example see Syroezhkin, K. L. and Akimbekov S. M. 1999. “Respublika Kazakhstan:
poisk putei ustoichivogo razvitiia” (Republic of Kazakhstan: seeking the ways of stable
development). Tsentral’naiia Asiia i Kavkaz: 5, 23-46
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amendments, appoint and dismiss the government, dissolve Parliament, call
referenda at his discretion etc.
The newly elected parliament did not proved to be very efficacious in
opposing government’s reforms by a vote of no-confidence. On the other hand,
since the government is formed not from members of different political platforms
but from high state officials – technocrats, 10 seats elected due to party lists do
not play important, if any, role in contemporary Kazakhstani politics.
1.5.2.3 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
According to the legislature, in order to be considered a non-governmental
organisation, all such groups must be officially registered either nationally, with
the Ministry of Justice, or locally with their local government departments.
According to the legislation there are three kinds of such organisations:
• Political organisations
• Non-political organisations
• Religious organisations.
The Constitution makes provisions for their rights and activities. These
organisations must be non-profit – in other words they have not rights to generate
profit from their activities. They are considered equal before the law. In the case
of activities which violate the Constitution or other legislation, the court system
has the right to shut them down. Furthermore, the state has the right to scrutinise
their activities to ensure they are acting according to the goals as set out in their
registration documents.
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According to the legislation, all such organisations must be open in their
activities, they must be self-governing, they must ensure equal rights for all
members and their activities must, of course, be in accordance with the laws of
the state. They may, for instance, conduct public hearings, hold meetings and
demonstrations and publish their own newspapers or books. They must not
interfere in the affairs of the government but they can cooperate with government
such as through contracts and agreements.
The number of NGOs in Kazakhstan has grown from 500 in the early
1990s to more than 7,000 in June 2001.112 These non-profit organizations provide
a variety of free services, including environmental education, legal assistance, and
cultural exchanges. (See Figure 1)
The Figure 1 details the main groupings of NGOs existing in Kazakhstan
and the percentage of NGOs working in each of the categories. The figure has
divided NGOs into the following eight categories: women’s organisations,
medical organisations; organisations of culture, arts, science and education;
children’s and youth organisations; organisations of the disabled; social service
organisations; ecological organisations and citizens’ rights organisations. The
biggest categories (each with 17 percent of the total) are those devoted to culture,
children and ecology. The smallest category is that of organisations devoted to
issues of disability, at 5 percent.
                                                          
112 Information on NGOs could be obtained form the Websites
http://win.cango.net.kg/db/kz/Default.asp, http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en
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Figure 1 Types of NGO in Kazakhstan
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 Source: http://www.ifescentralasia.kg/Kazakhstan/ENG/book_kze.html
Active NGOs include: the Almaty City Ecology Center, the Almaty City
Uighur Cultural Center, the Businessmen’s Congress of Kazakhstan, the
Chernobyl Union of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Congress of Entrepreneurs, the
Democratic Committee for Human Rights, the Almaty Helsinki Committee,
Artists’ Union, Ecological Fund of Kazakhstan “Initiative” Green Salvation, the
Intergovernmental Association of Uighurs, the Kazakhstan International Bureau
for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the Lop Noor - Semipalatinsk Ecological
Committee, the Pokoleniye Pensioner’s Movement, the Republican Society for
Legal Development of Kazakhstan, the Shalom Jewish Cultural Center, and the
Socio-Ecological Union. Although some of them are active participants of the
political life, for example, Pokoleniye took part in many oppositionist unions;
their role in the politics is insignificant.
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1.5.2.4. General Assessment
Totalitarian past has played very important role in shaping the Kazakshtani
society. After getting independence in 1991 Kazakhstan as well as other post-
Soviet states has committed itself to the principles of democracy. However, since
democratic political culture had not been known by large masses, democratization
had to be begun from above. N. Nazarbayev initiated first parties, all of which
were, naturally, pro-presidential. General deterioration of economy, decreasing
life standards shifted for a while the attention of masses as well as of elite from
the political to daily issues. However, the Supreme Soviet elected in 1994 was
successful in opposing some presidential decrees and in causing of governments’
resignation – a thing which had never seen before. Moreover, the Supreme Soviet
implied that a parliamentary republic would be the most appropriate system for
Kazakhstan. But the cost of being opposition was too high – the Supreme Soviet
was dissolved and the republic came under full presidential control. The President
necessitated adoption of the new constitution in order to convene new parliament.
New constitution, which envisioned powerful president who is characterized as
above all branches of power, and was adopted on 30 August 1995. New bicameral
parliament that was elected in December 1995 was not as efficacious as the
previous one in terms of opposing presidency since it could be dissolved by a
president at any moment. Thus, the republic made step back in shaping
democratic state. Presidential election of 1999, which OSCE suggested to re-hold,
was another example of strengthening the presidency in the republic. Main
presidential candidates were denied in registering their names, therefore,
automatically stayed out of the election, whereas some candidates without
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popular support were permitted to participate. Shortly, everything was prepared to
reelect the incumbent president. Parliamentary elections were held in October
1999. Some active oppositionists again were denied to register their names which
prevented them from running for MP. However, 10 mandates (out of 77 Majilis
seats) were subjected to party lists.
Thus, one has impression that Kazakhstan makes one step forward and
two steps back concerning transition to democracy. The main argument of the
President in 1990s was to conserve the existing stability in the country and
strengthen the institute of presidency in order to fully implement reforms.
However, the end of 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium have been
marked with different approach of Nazarbayev toward democratization. His
speeches encouraged democratization and the formation of strong opposition with
alternative program of reforms.
The symptoms of democracy have been seen in speeches of the President
since the end of 1990s. For example, the President in his “Address to the People
of Kazakhstan” made on September 30, 1998,
I propose to you today a Kazakhstan for the 21st century based on sound
and sensible values.
I propose to you a Kazakhstan based on a new economy.
I propose to you a Kazakhstan built upon democratic principles.
I propose to you new structures and procedures for Kazakhstan based on
effectiveness and fairness of the Government.
I propose to you continuing to build a strong and secure Kazakhstan that
plays a noticeable role in the world.
This is the Kazakhstan that I propose for our children.
A Kazakhstan that rejects religious extremism.
A Kazakhstan that rejects national extremism.
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And, finally, a Kazakhstan which loudly and clearly rejects political
extremism.113
As another example of the late commitment of Kazakhstani President to
democratic principles is his speech “Towards Free, Effective and Secure Society,
The Message of the President of the Country to the People of Kazakhstan” made
on October 24, 2000 where he emphasizes that
[t]he main political lesson of the end of XX century consists in
universality of democratization formula. All talks about special type of
democracy are attempts to deviate from democratic principles.
Therefore, we should clearly understand that deviation from
democratization processes is a withdrawal from world tendency, it is the
way to nothing. The direction of movement has been developed by
centuries-old history of democratic societies.114
What is interesting here is the first sentence where the President pointed out the
end of 20th century. On the other hand, N. Nazarbayev who previously
emphasized the difference between democratic practices in the world and that
democracy in Kazakhstan may be different than in Western democratic countries,
clearly adopted the universality of the idea. I think that it is not the case that he
simply has understood that his previous ideas on democratization were baseless,
but he has waited for suitable time to announce his democratic commitment or
has been pressed by external forces such as USA, OSCE etc. or both of them were
valid at the same time. Some subchapters of the next chapter will try to analyse
this case.
                                                          
113 Full text of the speech could be obtained from the Website
[http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en]
114 Full text of the speech is available at the Website
[http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en]
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
2.1 Social Structure
Social structure is very important from the point of analysing democratic
tendencies of particular nation, since “deep, cumulative social inequalities
represent a poor foundation for democracy”115. In the case of post-communist
states we face a unique situation, which never existed before, since the society,
here of Kazakhstan, has been undergone social changes that has led to social
stratification never exercised in the past.
I had already discussed social structure of traditional Kazakh society in
Introduction, therefore, here I would like to mention features of the Soviet
society. Although it was claimed that the USSR was the classless society, even
the last Constitution of the USSR adopted the existence of two classes: those of
workers, peasants, plus one stratum – the intelligentsia116. This classification was
not accepted officially till the All-Union Congress, which took place in Minsk in
January 1966, since “in communist countries the study of the power structure was
a taboo”117. It was only in the years of N. Kruschev’s “thaw” when social
structure of socialist society was begun to be subjected to studying. Only after
                                                          
115 Linz, Juan et al (eds.). 1990. Politics in Developing Countries, Boulder & London: Lynne
Rienner Publications, 19.
116 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR.1978. Alma-Ata: Gylym.
117 Brucan, Silviu. 1998. Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe. London: Praeger, 1.
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death of Stalin Soviet sociologists could discuss their opinion on social structure
of the socialist society. Zev Katz presented the summary of the debates and
studies published after the Minsk Congress in such a way:
1. The natchalniks (rulers, leaders)–essentially the ruling social
group
2. The intelligentsia–the highly educated specialists in various
fields
3. The white-collar employees–service and technical non-manual
workers of lesser education
4. The manual workers–ranging from unskilled to the highly
skilled
5. The kolkhoz peasants–including both rank-and-file labor and
the administrative staff and cooperative sector
6. The privately employed–hired and self-employed persons not
drawing wages in the state and cooperative sectors118
Four of them were characterised as “classes” and two–as stratum (the white-
collars employers and the privately owned). The reason why they referred as
strata not as classes was their lacking in loading of class determinants119.
Which class had the dominant position? The answer was “a piece of
cake”: the party bureaucrats, ie. the nachalniki, which was consisted of full-time
party and government officials who ran all state institutions, civil and military, so-
called nomenklatura. Their privileges as a ruling class were high salaries, access
to a wide range of restricted services.
The other classes––the intelligentsia, the manual workers and kolkhoz
peasants–were subjected to different definitions. In China, for instance, the
intelligentsia had become part of the working class in 1978 by the decision of the
                                                          
118 Ibid, 2.
119 Ibid, 3.
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Communist Party Central Committee120, whereas in the USSR it had still accepted
as a different class (social category) when country collapsed. The manual
workers, which played a big role in the construction of socialism, “became in the
eighties a dwindling social group” because of scientific-technological
revolution121 and “within the working class the center of gravity was shifting from
the manual working class to the intellectual one”122. In the case of the kolkhoz
peasants, Soviet sociologists stated further social stratification. Four main
occupational groups were characterised as a statistical bodies: “administrative
personnel and specialists, mechanizers (or agricultural machinery operators),
poultry and livestock farmers or handlers, and ordinary field workers”123.
This structure was valid till the USSR was collapsed and Kazakhstan
gained its independence in 1991. After becoming independent Kazakhstan began
to introduce free market-oriented policies (See Chapter 1) that led to changes in
the structure of the society.
Social structures have been deeply affected by macroeconomic and
social-sector reforms. V. Mickalev stated that “Differences in transition strategies
across countries - thus differences in the duration and length of recessions and
inflation episodes – are important determinants of changes in social
stratification”124. He added that social polarisation was further intensified by
privatisation – which shifted assets toward the wealthy – and by the rise in
                                                          
120 Ibid, 19.
121 Ibid, 18.
122 Ibid, 18.
123 Ibid, 25.
124 Mickalev, Vladimir. Transition’s Social Cost, at the Website [www.wider.unu.edu]
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earnings inequality associated with changes in labour markets. Moreover, the
collapse of the socialist state created an administrative vacuum leading to the
erosion of the social security system and a worsening situation for society’s most
vulnerable people.
One of the significant causes of poverty has been unemployment.
Moreover, many pensioners are poor together with many children living in large
and single-parent families. In contrast, new elite has arisen. This small group
consists of the nomenklatura, enterprise managers and younger professionals who
have adjusted to the new situation.
Rising income inequality has been associated with profound changes in
social structures. Old societal structure has been replaced by new social classes in
the transition to a market economy. People’s prospects in life are now largely
determined by their possession of assets, goods and income opportunities. Change
has been widespread, but it is not yet complete. Kazakhstani economy, as well as
economies of other post-communist states, remains mixed system in which
markets coexist with limited redistribution through the state.
The new pattern of social stratification is becoming clearer, although
there are serious methodological and data problems in estimating its size. First,
there is a new elite – the product of emerging capitalism. Second, the new
commercial, managerial, and professional middle class has grown rapidly but has
not been formed yet. Despite the rise of the new elite and the middle-class, the
most numerous group consists of blue-collar workers, farmers, and state-sector
employees. There are a number of the most socially deprived and marginalised
people who are in long-term poverty.
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Social polarisation in Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics has
large economic costs. The fact that corruption and crime in post-Soviet republics
is more widespread than in Central Europe, where inequality has risen by less, is
directly related with income distribution. Thus, a more active social policy –
promoting better livelihoods and more investment in human capital – could have
large economic returns. But there is a need for effective public transfers and
income redistribution policies to alleviate and reduce poverty. Social cohesion
cannot be ignored. In turn, social cohesion creates a suitable for democratic
development environment, where large middle class would lead toward
democratic consolidation.
2.2 The National Structure
One of the main features of Kazakhstani society, which is the outcome of
Kazakhstan’s past shaped by both Tsarist and Soviet policies, is, its multiethnic
composition. What surprises one, is its stability in ethnic terms, i. e. the reality is
that, Kazakhs and Slavs live in cohesion, as well as other nationalities. What are
the mechanisms that provide such kind of stability? Before answering such kind
of question it will be useful to provide some historical and statistical data on the
matter.
As it could be understood from Chapter 1, the process of the formation
of the Kazakhstani multiethnic society could be divided into five stages:
(i) Russian colonisation; the organisation of Cossack formations of
Uralsk, Siberia and Semirechye.
(ii) The years of Soviet rapid industrialisation policy (1930s).
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(iii) The deportation of some nationalities from their homeland to
Kazakhstan during the late 1930s-1940s.
(iv) The project of settling new lands (osvoyeniye tselinnih zemel’)
(v) Contemporary migration processes. (See Table 10)
Table 10 Inward and Outward Migration in Kazakhstan (1990-1997)
Year Immigrant Emigrant
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
174 900
206 094
190 045
111 274
70 452
71 137
53 874
38 067
339 700
288 184
393 345
344 274
507 052
348 537
261 474
252 922
Source: The Report of the Agency of Republic of the Kazakhstan on Statistics,
www.kazstat.asdc.kz/indexe.htm
As it is seen from the Table 10, emigration has totally outnumbered
immigration in Kazakhstan. Emigrants have been mainly Germans, Jews,
Russians, and Ukrainians, which migrated respectively to Germany, Israel, Russia
and Ukraine.  The difference between these nationalities’ size before 1990 and in
1999 can be clearly seen in Appendices.
However, this stability in ethnic terms in a country that has two main
religions – Islam and Russian Orthodox Church – and where two main
nationalities coexist has been seemed worth studying for western scholars.
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Whereas some westerners see the future of Kazakhstan in dark frames125, others
believe that current stability owes much to personality of N. Nazarbayev and that
post-Nazarbayev era will witness political turmoil. There are ones, according to
whom, “Political stability has been preserved in Kazakhstan, in large part because
this republic was part of much larger multi-national state”126.
It seems to me that what constitutes the core of ethnic stability of
Kazakhstan is, among other factors, mainly well-implemented (balanced)
governmental policies have directed to balance relations between Kazakhs and
Slavs, since as it is seen from Appendix 1, main nationalities are Kazakhs and
Russians who sum up %83.4 of the total Kazakhstani population. “Kazakhstan’s
political stability will depend much on the existence of a harmonious ethnic
relation chiefly between the natives and the Slavs”127.
First years of independence marked with the policy of “Kazakhization”:
traditional names of cities and landmarks were restored, Kazakh history was
reassessed in order to reflect a Kazakh national perspective, Kazakh and Islamic
holidays were begun to be celebrated at a country-wide scale.
However, country had, and still has important Russian minority.
Therefore, N. Nazarbayev has decided to implement two-fold policy, cause
[y]et Kazakhization is not enough to secure the success of Kazakh
nation-building, as it threatens to provoke a backlash from the state’s
substantial minority, faced as it is with political disempowerment and
                                                          
125 For example, Graham Fuller, a research fellow from RAND, expressed this view at a
conference organized by Woodrow Wilson Foundation in Washington, DC (8-9 September,
1994).
126 Olcott, Martha. 1993. “Kazakhstan After Independence”. In Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.),
Nations & Politics in the Soviet Successor States, UK: Cambridge University Press, 313.
127 Janabel, Jibek. 1996. “When national Ambition Conflicts With Reality: studies on
Kazakhstan’s ethnic relations,” Central Asian Survey: 15(1), 5-21.
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social disorientation. Therefore, Nazarbayev has coupled it to policy he
has dubbed “harmonization”, which encourages the participation of
Russians in all facets of Kazakh life and seeks, if not their assimilation,
then at least their tacit acceptance of Kazakh rule. Automatic citizenship,
wide tolerance of Russian language and culture, and government
subsidies to the Russian-dominated industrial sector are all components
of this policy.128
All policies of the president as well as of the Government were directed toward
creating a balance between these two main nationalities in social as well as in
political spheres. For example, according to 1995 Constitution Kazakh language
is official one, whereas Russian language was “conferred official government
status”. Another example is banknotes of 500, 1000 and 2000 Tenge (national
currency), in which one side is written in Kazakh and another - in Russian. The
fact that 47% of state servants are Kazakhs clearly shows the policy aimed at
balancing two nationalities.129 In other sectors the percentage of Kazakh
employees is as follows: in spheres of health, culture, sport and art – 44%, of
education – 50.6 %, of industry and transport – 27.5 %, of construction – 22 %.130
On the other hand, Kazakh nationalist parties such as Azat, Alash and
Jeltoksan were closed or restricted in their activities. Political forces based on
Russian identity such as Edinstvo failed to establish country-wide organisations
and remained relatively local ones.131
So as it is understood from the facts mentioned above, this stability has
been mainly the outcome of governmental policies. It should be said that these
                                                          
128 Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt. 1996. “The Trouble with democracy in Kazakhstan,” Central
Asian Survey: 15 (2), 182.
129 Satiyev, H. 1998, 10.
130 Ibid, 14.
131 For more information see Janabel, Jiger. 1996.
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policies were successful to maintain nation-building process of multiethnic
society of Kazakhstan.
Finally, to prove this view, let us look what the Kazakhstanis have
thought on “ethnic question”. The survey was made among representatives of
Kazakhs and Russians in 1992 and 1996 and the main question asked was “What
provides the stability in interethnic relations in Kazakhstan?” Answers can be
clearly seen at Table 11.
Table 11 Reasons for the stability in interethnic relations in Kazakhstan (% of
total respondents)
1992 1996
Reasons Kazakhs Russians Kazakhs Russians
Flexible policy of
government 34.8 35.7 41.2 32.7
Difficulties of economic life 11.8 7.1 9.2 10.8
People understand their
common fate 26.4 14.2 28.6 24.5
Friendly relations from the
past 20.8 40.5 17.6 29.6
Activities of political
organisations 2.3 1.1 3.4 2.4
Note: The survey results were published in Malinin G.V. 1997. Mejnatsyionalnoye soglasiye v
Kazakhstane: problemy, protivorechiia, perspektivi (Intertiethnic cohesion in Kazahstan:
problems, contradictions, perspectives), Almaty: Gylym, 89.
As it can be understood from Table 11, the main factor providing
stability is, according to respondents, flexible policy of government. On the other
hand, thoughts about the common fate of people of Kazakhstan in transitional
period play very important role too. We should add to this continuation of
friendly relations from the past, which also can be shown as one of the major
factors.
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Conclusion can be drawn that Kazakhstan, although has heterogeneous
society is not unstable country in ethnic terms. This stability is mainly outcome of
governmental policies, which have played a role of balancing power in
multiethnic relations. However, other factors such as friendship that has its roots
in Soviet times, the belief in common fate of all people of Kazakhstan should not
be underestimated too.
2.3 State Structure
It is known that the Soviet Union as was due to its socialistic nature (as it was
mentioned before, the last constitution of the USSR proclaimed the Soviet Union
as the country fully exercising socialism) was completely centralised country.
Before focusing on contemporary Kazakhstan’s decision making structure it may
be useful to examine the old one of the Soviet times. (See Figure 2)
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Figure 2 Simplified structure of decision making in the USSR (after 1977
Constitution)
POLITBURO of the Communist
Party of USSR
PRESIDIUM
SUPREME SOVIET
SOVIET OF
UNION
SOVIET OF
NATIONALI
TIES
GOVERNMENT                             PARTY                              ECONOMY
Source: Bater, James. 1980, 38.
As it is seen from Figure 2, all decisions in the USSR concerning
governmental, economy and party issues, ie in all spheres of life, were made in
Politburo. In all 15 republics, including Kazakhstan, the same hierarchy was
created conditioning all their decisions had to be in line with the Politburo’s.
Figure 3 is about decision-making environment of municipal government. The
Figure clearly shows hierarchy of decision-making process that was valid in the
USSR.
Such a totalitarian system could not allow non-governmental
organisations to function, formed rare NGOs were closed and their members were
repressed. (See previous sections). Only at the end of 80s, when liberalization of
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the Soviet system was at its peak, non-governmental organizations began to
function legally. As it was mentioned in Part 2, nowadays Kazakhstan has about
7,000 NGOs. However, some of them have played more or less important role in
the political life, eg Pensioners’ Movement  “Pokoleniye”, has an image of
oppositionist line.
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Figure 3 Schematic outline of decision-making environment of municipal government in the USSR (after 1977 Constitution)
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It is obvious that NGOs are still weak and rarely known by ordinary
people. Although there are no proper data on the proportion of the population
engaged in NGOs, According to survey made by IFES (The International
Foundation for Election Systems) 40 percent of the population would consider
joining an environmental, social welfare, or educational NGO. However, only 19
percent of those surveyed said that they aware of existence of NGOs in their
communities, while 74 percent knew nothing of any such groups. 45 percent of
the population believes that NGOs are “essential” or “necessary”, while 41
percent believe that NGOs are “not very necessary” or “not necessary at all”.132
These results clearly show the attitude of the population towards NGOs, which
could be characterised as creative suitable environment for non-government
organisations, but everyday issues mainly based on economic grounds prevent
many citizens from participating in NGO activities.
The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan contains many
articles on strengthening central government at the expense of weakening local
administrators. For example, Akims (major executives) of the oblasts (main
districts – Kazakhstan nowadays has 14 oblasts), major cities and the capital shall
be appointed to office by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of
the Prime Minister, whereas Akims of other administrative-territorial units are
appointed or elected to office in the order, determined by the President of the
                                                          
132IFES-based survey was conducted in 1996. See: [www.ifes.org] IFES is a private, non-profit
organization established in 1987. IFES provides non-partisan technical assistance in the promotion
of democracy worldwide and serves as a clearinghouse for information about democratic
development and elections. Since its inception, IFES has grown and worked in more than 100
countries around the world, earning an international reputation for the highest quality assistance
and research in support of building and consolidating democratic institutions.
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Republic of Kazakhstan. The President of the Republic has the right to release
Akims from office at his own discretion (Article 87).133 This article has
envisioned Akims to be President’s local representatives, which inevitable has led
to the concentration of power in the hands of the President. Actually,
experimental elections of some local Akims are scheduled for fall 2001, but it
seems that the existing situation will not be considerably changed in the nearest
future.
Such a situation when local administrators are subjected to President’s
appointment is natural consequence of state’s past. Ruler of a country which past
was shaped by totalitarian system, naturally, would show tendency towards
adopting centralised state where most decisions are taken by the centre, and
where local administrators are nothing but only the implementators of a central
policy. Without any doubt, one of the good examples of such a state is
Kazakhstan.
As a result, it is quite obvious that Kazakhstan still exercises centralised
system with very little space to non-governmental organisations. Kazakhstani
people, although have not rejected the idea of NGOs, have had little concern
about joining their activities due to other primary problems, which partly could be
because of their unfamiliarity with NGOs in the past.
                                                          
133 Sapargaliyeva, G. 1998. Konstitutsia Respubliki Kazakhstan. Kommentarii (Comments on the
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2.4 Political Structure
Political structure of Kazakhstan that has adopted a strong presidency is one of
the legacies of the totalitarian past, reminiscent single-party system when all
decisions were taken by the center. In order to understand the existing political
structure it is necessary to examine the presidential powers. (See Figure 4)
Figure 4 Powers of the President in Kazakhstan
Notes: *Rayon is a smaller than oblast district, an oblast consists of many rayons.
               used to indicate direct relationship
               used to indicate indirect relationship
As it is seen from Figure 4, the President has great influence in all areas
of the state.  The President is the head of state and directs both foreign and
domestic policy. Under the Constitution, the President ensures that all branches of
state power are properly functioning. The President also:
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• appoints the Prime Minister with the consent of the legislature,
• may dismiss the Prime Minister and therefore the government as well,
• has the authority to approve the structure of the government as proposed  by
the Prime Minister,
• may appoint and dismiss individual members of the government,
• may direct the government to introduce a bill in the parliament,
• appoints the Akims,
• may annul or suspend the actions of the government and those of subordinate
levels of government such as the heads or Akims of oblasts and major cities
and the capitals.
 The influence of the Presidency extends to the legislative branch as well.
Here, the President
• has the right to directly appoint seven members of the Senate
• has the power to dissolve the parliament in three instances. Firstly, if it passes
a vote of no confidence in the government. Secondly, if it refuses twice to
consent to the appointment of a prime-minister of the president’s choosing.
And thirdly, if there is a political crisis resulting from differences between the
parliament and other branches of state power. The parliament, upon a two-
thirds vote, may delegate its legislative authority to the president for up to one
year.
• has the right to determine priority consideration of draft laws and to designate
draft laws “urgent,” in which case parliament must consider them within one
month.  If the parliament fails to do so, the president may issue a decree with
the force of law.
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• can ask the prime minister to introduce legislation on his or her behalf.  If a
draft law submitted by the government is rejected, the Prime Minister may
bring a vote of no confidence, which, if passed, results in the dissolution of
the parliament. If rejected, results in the passage of the government’s
legislation without a vote by the parliament.  However, the government may
not to this more than twice each year.
The president also has the right, in limited circumstances, to issue
decrees, laws and decrees having the force of law and can call for a referendum.
The president also has significant powers concerning the judiciary. For
example, the president
• has the right to appoint the chairperson and two members of the Constitutional
Council, which having been composed of seven members, advises on the
constitutionality of proposed laws. (Two other members are appointed by the
chairperson of the Senate and two by the chairperson of the Majilis),
• is the head of the Highest Judicial Council and has the power to appoint its
members.  On the recommendation of this Council, the Senate elects the
chairpersons of the Supreme Court and the Law Collegiums, and the Justices
of the Supreme Court.
• has the power to appoint all judges to the oblast courts and lower courts on the
recommendation of the Qualification Collegium of Justice.
The absence of strong parties as well as of NGOs, on the one hand – has
contributed to the powerfulness of the President and has created a vacuum in the
system that has tried to be filled by the Presidency – on the other. Although
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Kazakhstan has 16 registered political parties and movements134, because of
several factors discussed below, the existing political system is not a competitive
one.135
 Objective factors. These factors are ones determined by historical
development of the Kazakhstani society in the transitional period. Among the
others, the population has affected by the transition form central planned
economy to market one – a process which has very severe consequences for large
masses – more than 65 percent of total population has become impoverished, as it
was mentioned before. Under such conditions, the majority of the population
suffering discomfort from the existing economic situation has been uninterested
in political issues, ie has become apolitical. Thus, for many Kazakhstanis the idea
of supporting political parties has become unacceptable.
Another factor is that social stratification has not been completed yet.
Nowadays Kazakhstani society consists of large masses of impoverished and very
few numbers of well beings. As a result of unstable and speedy economic
processes, strong supporter of democratic ideas - middle class – is still on its way
of formation.136 Under such circumstances political parties have been uncertain
about social base they address and could rely on. In addition, the absence of
noteworthy polarisation between state and citizens should be mentioned.
Apolitical Kazakhstani society that used to directly communicate with state
                                                          
134 Chebotarev, A. 2000. “Partiinoye Stroitel’stvo v Kazahstane” (Party Building in Kazakhstan),
at the Website  [www.kisi.kz]; and [http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en].
Political parties can be divided into three categories: ‘pro-presidential’, ‘constructive” opposition
and “hard” opposition.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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organs during the Soviet times, does not need political parties as mediators
between state and society. Moreover, still many people expect state to solve all
their problems, in other words, paternalistic expectations are still on the agenda.
All these factors have led to indifferent population regarding political parties.
 Subjective factors are factors related with activities of political parties
and their policies. Many parties have been inactive in the political arena. Some
parties were established due to existing political conjuncture when there was a
need for a political party to participate in political activities such as parliamentary
elections. As a result, parties established for fulfilling certain tasks within
particular time, after completing their mission became de facto inactive players of
the politics.
Moreover, many pro-governmental parties were established by initiative
from “above”, ie by MPs or state officials who automatically became their
chairmen. Although such approach could play a positive role in establishing a
cadre party, it proved to be unsuitable for the Kazakhstani political system, since
their members have not actively participated in the politics and such parties not
being supported by large masses have not proved to survive.
Another subjective factor is that the absence of competition atmosphere
among parties, what can be explained by similarity of their programs with few
exceptions, has led to inactivity of political parties. In addition, many parties have
been guided mainly by their leaders’ personal ambitions and have not reflected
people’s interests. Thus when a leader became a state official, a leader of another
establishment, or concentrated his or her activities in another sphere, their parties
were “paralysed” in the sense of political activity.
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Finally, lack of financial resources is one of the most important reasons
of party passivity. It is obvious that impossibility of paying rent, publishing
newspaper etc, would lead to party inactivity.
Artificial factors. This group includes factors which have been outcomes
of state policy towards party building process and party activities. The most
prominent one is the absence of any mechanisms regulating participation of
political parties in the political life of the country:
(a) although according to the Constitution and Law “On Elections”
parties have a right to participate in election not only by party lists but also by
nominating candidacies for single-mandate districts, it is clear that participation
of political parties in presidential and parliamentary elections is limited. First of
all, the number of seats accredited to party lists is very small (10 out of 77) and
this disproportion has led to de facto inactivity of MPs elected from party lists. In
addition, practice of election MPs from party lists did not change rules regarding
formation of party fractions in the Majilis, and their activities. According to the
“Presidential Decree on Kazakhstani Parliament and Status of MPs” dated
October 16, 1995, party fraction can be formed minimum by ten party members.
Because of this regulation parties rely mainly on the results of single-mandate
districts’ elections. But such a situation leads to emphasising not party affiliation
but personal characteristics of candidates. As a result, apolitical constituency
gives votes for particular personalities without concerning party affiliation;
(b) parties have not proven to be active in the Parliament. Some
Kazakhstani parties have not their representatives in the legislature or have not
enough members to form party fractions. Moreover, party members sometimes
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adopt different form party line policies since parties do not have any mechanisms
that enable them to control party members;
(c) government members are appointed by a president on apolitical
basis, whereas, ideally, parties that have majority of seats in a parliament should
form a government. Obviously, this factor amidst the others has negative effect on
party building process in the country.
 On the other hand, character of legal base regulating party activities can
be defined as undemocratic and prohibitive one. Law “On Political Parties” dated
July 2, 1996,
– mainly focuses on state control of party activities than on regulating party
activities;
– completely ignores party activities concerning state governance;
– do not provide political parties specific rights, thus not differentiating them
from other public associations;
– envisions very strict rules concerning establishment and registration of
political parties. For example, a party can be registered only if it already has
three thousand members.
– along with the 1995 Constitution prohibit political parties from receiving
financing from the state and abroad.
Thus, the existing party system in Kazakhstan is far from being perfect.
Tempo of party building process has been very slow, which, in turn, has led to the
creation of political vacuum and has slowed down social transformations. It
seems that under existing circumstances, state should be an initiator of changing
such a situation taking necessary measures for effective party building.
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The judicial system of Kazakhstan has been improving. The Republic
currently has Constitutional Council, although it previously had a Constitutional
Court under the prior 1993 Constitution, which had played a crucial role in
dismissing the Parliament of 1994 election. On the other hand, a system of law
courts, represented by the Supreme Court at the highest level, followed by oblast
and local courts, was established for both criminal and civil matters.
Kazakhstani Constitutional Council has seven members. In addition to
these seven, former Presidents have the right to life membership on the
Constitutional Council. The President appoints the Chairperson and two other
members.  Two are appointed by the Chairperson of the Senate and two – by the
Chairperson of the Majilis. The general term of appointment is six years but half
of them are re-appointed each year.
An issue may be brought to the Constitutional Council by the President,
the Prime Minister, the Chairpersons of the Senate or Majilis, or jointly by at least
one-fifth of MPs. In addition, courts may ask the Constitutional Council to
declare a law unconstitutional if it finds that a law or regulatory act infringes on
the constitutional rights of a citizen.
If a draft law is found to be unconstitutional before it is enacted, the
Parliament is expected to make necessary changes that would bring a law in line
with the Constitution. If a law is found to be unconstitutional after it is enacted
the law may not be enforced.
Kazakhstan has a Highest Judicial Council which is headed by the
President and whose members are the Chairpersons of the Constitutional Council
and the Supreme Court, the Procurator General, the Minister of Justice, and others
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appointed by the President.  This Council nominates candidates for the offices of
Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Chairpersons of the Collegiums, and the
Judges of the Supreme Court.  The Senate elects the nominees who are
recommended by the Council and put before the Senate for a vote by the
President.
The Chairpersons of oblast courts, the Chairpersons of the Collegiums
and Judges of the oblast courts are recommended by the Highest Judicial Council
and appointed directly by the President without a vote of the Senate.
The Qualification Collegium of Justice is an autonomous, independent
institution composed of deputies of the Majilis, judges, public prosecutors, and
others involved in the legal profession.  The Collegium makes recommendations
for the appointment of other lower-court judges on the proposal of the Minister of
Justice.  The President also appoints these lower court judges.
Judges are considered “permanent” and may not be suspended or
removed from office without following the procedures established in the law on
the judiciary.  In order to be appointed a judge must be at least twenty-five years
old, have a higher juridical education and have passed a qualification
examination.
Although it can be claimed that the Constitution Council as well as the
law courts play an important role in the implementation and development of the
rule of law in Kazakhstan, it is obvious that the President has very big influence
on the judiciary of Kazakhstan thanks to presidential powers mentioned before.
This section can be summarised in similarity with other sections, way:
the political system of Kazakhstan represents highly centralised semi-presidential
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system. All branches of power are directly dependent on the President, whereas
other powers that play a role of checks and balances in other political systems,
such as political parties, have proved to be weak and ineffective, partly because of
state policies have been implemented, and partly because of other factors
discussed above. Therefore, some part of population has not been represented in
the Parliament. In such a political system, the presidential commitment to
democratic ideas determines successful completion of transitional to democracy
stage. However, although the incumbent President has emphasized his
commitment to democratic ideas and has implemented more or less relatively
democratic policies compared to other Central Asian states (with the exception of
Kyrgyzstan), another leader with strong authoritarian tendencies may easily
transform the country into an authoritarian state in a full sense (as is in the case of
Uzbekistan). In order to prevent this, strong NGOs as well as other powers which
play a role of checks and balances have to be developed.
2.5 Political Leadership
Although ruling political leaders of Kazakh republic have always underlined their
commitment to democracy, they never give a priority to establishing a democracy
focusing primarily on economic issues. What is interesting, the term “democracy”
has been used both by ruling elites and their opposition. Former group has used
the term to justify thesis on implementing necessary reforms before fully
exercising democracy, which would create required for establishing civil society
and political parties conditions (for which, particular period of time is needed – I
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argue that ultimately, the time allowed for implementing reforms was finished –
partially due to international pressure – and the ruling elite began to introduce
democratic reforms). Latter group has defined democracy as institute which is
able to optimise social and economic transformations under existing
circumstances (thus, it must be exercised today and any extra time is not needed).
Generally, it could be argued that lack of consensus between opposition and
rulers has been conditioned by following circumstances:
(i) rulers use the term democracy as a complicated formation which includes
well-working mechanism of checks and balances within state apparatus,
whereas opposition interpret this term as “openness” concerning
administrative decisions, and ability to control decision-makers;
(ii) former group emphasize unreadiness of the population to accept
democratic norms while latter group claim the opposite;
(iii) ruling elite characterise democracy as a regime which is to be established
only after transition to a market economy will be ended and justify their
thesis by showing examples of South Korea and Chile, the opposition
points out foreign investments have been made in the republic, which in
turn would prevent any danger related with regime changing.137
Guiding by such different ideas on democracy opposition and the rulers
have failed to reach an agreement, to make a pact. Instead of reaching a consensus
rulers have appropriated “legal” methods to deal with the opposition. For
example, former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was banned from running
                                                          
137 Zhusupov, Sabit. 2000. “Demokraticheskiie preobrazovaniyya v Respublike Kazahstan:
real’nost’ i perspektivy” (Democratic transformations in Kazakhstan: the reality and future),
Tsentral’naiia Asiia i Kavkaz: 4, 24-40.
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his candidacy in presidential election of 1999 due to “administrative sanction”
received within one-year period before the date of election. Human Rights Watch
World Report 2000 on Kazakhstan stated that harassment of opposition political
activists continued in 2000.138 For example, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a leader of
RPP, was charged with illegal weapon possession, and with tax evasion; another
opposition activist and member of RPP Madel Ismailov who once served a year in
prison on charges of “offending the honour and dignity of the President”, was
sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention, because of his participation in
unsanctioned peaceful demonstration in January 2000.
In sum, political leaders which are in power have used a neutralising
policy towards the opposition instead of adopting more flexible policy, justifying
their deeds by social stability and economic recovery: “Democracy is not only
political freedoms in spite of their importance and value. This is also realization
of a number of other fundamental rights including the right on worthy economic
conditions of life and security”.139 Thus, transition process to democracy has been
slowed down by governmental (presidential) policies, which could be seen as a
consequence of the absence of democratic experiences both of rulers and of the
opposition. Nevertheless, it seems that the President finally decided to make
significant steps toward a democratic state (see below for arguments).
                                                          
138 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 (Kazakhstan) can be obtained from the Website
[www.humanrightswatch.org]
139 From the speech of the President made October 24, 2000. Full text of the speech could be
obtained from the Website [http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en]
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2.6 Development Performance
Kazakhstan got its independence in very difficult circumstances. In the first years
of independence GDP felt down by more than a half. All economic ties were
broken. The country faced another economic breakdown in the mid of 90s. Only
after the year of 1996 GDP began to increase (with the exception of 1998 when
Russian crisis occurred). GDP increased in 2000 by more than 10 percent.
Investments and industrial production output increased as well. Vast natural
resources, in case if rationally used, would lead to consistent economic growth.
However, income distribution has been unequal – more than half of
population lived below the line of poverty in 1998. Transition to a market
economy was very painful to more than half of Kazakhstani population,
especially to the elders, who used to benefit from Soviet social security policies
before the collapse of the old system. “We had to make painful reforms. Social
price of reforms, especially on the first stage, was high. The rate was so high that
there was a question whether independent Kazakhstan would exist”.140  Since the
budgetary expenses were minimized independent Kazakhstan could not meet all
their expectations.
An advantage of authoritarian state shows itself in economic transition. It
can be argued whether contemporary economic growth is mostly an outcome of
consistent presidential economic program or of high prices of some raw materials,
first of all – petroleum which have led to capital accumulation. But without doubt,
                                                          
140 Full text of the speech could be obtained from
[http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en]
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the President has played an important role in achieving economic boom. Middle-
run future perspectives of Kazakhstani economy were summarised by the
President as follows:
Without going into details I will say what we are to do here in the
nearest years: to lay new transport schemes to international markets; to
modernize strategic and transit roads; build schemes in direction of “East
- West” and “South - North” more actively; to develop Caspian
infrastructure; actively reconstruct the road from Almaty to Astana.
(…)What do we plan to achieve in five years? Forecasts are always risky
but guided by calculation we put new tasks for the country and its
people and we are sure that:
• real GDP will grow by 30%;
• growth of real salaries will be not less than 25-30%;
• annual inflation will not exceed 4-5%;
• tax receipts to the state budget will be 25% of GDP;
• budget deficit will not exceed 1,5% of GDP.141
In the long run, Kazakhstani economy has a potential to be a leading one in the
region, first of all due to vast resources of petroleum as well as other natural
resources. Although Kazakhstan is a land-locked country, its geopolitical position
could be an advantage, since it is located both in Europe and Asia.
It seems that several factors will affect whether economic growth will
continue or not. Let us point out some of them. Firstly, it is obvious that social
stability is a life-or-death matter for achieving economic growth, especially for
Kazakhstan where only 53% of the population are Kazakhs. Secondly, rational
use of resources and attraction of foreign investments, undoubtedly will be main
driving forces behind economic boom. How successful will be the President in
achieving these aims will determine economic situation in the country. But what
is more important, or let us say, what must go hand in hand with economic
                                                          
141 Ibid. (emphasises are original)
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growth is democratization of the society, since not only economic growth but also
democratic society in prosperity must be the aim.
2.7 International Factors
Kazakhstan’s experience with the rest of the World has begun since gaining
independence in 1991. At Soviet times, according to Soviet Constitution,
Kazakhstan de jure had the right to leave the Union and, therefore, could open its
embassies worldwide after leaving the Union. But de facto this right had never
been realised. All relations with foreign countries were regulated by Moscow.
Only after the Centre’s control over the country was broke up,
Kazakhstan became able to establish its embassies and implement independent
foreign policy. Kazakhstan became a member of OSCE, UN, and other regional
as well as global international organizations. Without any doubt, membership in
such organisations has played very important role in democratization process in
Kazakhstan. I want to focus on practises of some international organizations and
the United States of America.
 Kazakhstani democratic experience was criticised many times by OSCE
which did not send its full mission to 1999 Presidential elections due to
undemocratic practises. For example, main candidate of the opposition Akezhan
Kazhegeldin was banned from running as a candidate. OSCE suggested
Kazakhstan to annul election results and hold a new one. Nursultan Nazarbayev’s
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response was that OSCE applied double standards to Kazakhstan142, therefore
election results were not annulled.
In January 2000, the OSCE/ODIHR issued final report on recent
parliamentary elections where outlined seventeen recommendations that “made in
spirit of assisting to improve the level of compliance with the 1990 OSCE
Copenhagen Document”.143
European Union envisioned TACIS (Technical Assistance to
Commonwealth of Independent States) Program.144 Moreover, President of the
European Commission Romano Prodi and External Relations Commissioner
Chris Patten met with President in June 2000 and reportedly stressed the need for
further progress towards democracy. In July 2000, the EU/Kazakhstan
Cooperation Council held the second meeting where political and human rights
issues were discussed.
The end of 1999-the mid of 2000 was period when many American high
officials visited Kazakhstani lands. In December 1999, the US/Kazakhstan Joint
Commission chaired by Vice President Al Gore obtained President Nazarbayev’s
commitment to work closely with the OSCE on implementing democratic
reforms. The head of the CIA, the head of the FBI, NATO Commander, and
Secretary of the State Madeleine Albright visited Kazakhstan in the spring of
                                                          
142 Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 2000. OBSE praktikuet dvoiniie standarty. (OSCE applied double
standards to Kazakhstan) [www.eurasia.org.ru]
143 The Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 2000.
144 Launched by the EC in 1991, the TACIS Programme provides grant-financed technical
assistance to 13 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan), and mainly aims at enhancing the transition process in these countries.
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2000. All of them emphasised the importance of commitment to democratic
practises for regional stability.145
It can be claimed that Nazarbayev’s recent commitment to democracy146
as to an “universal value" is partly the outcome of international pressure, since
Kazakhstan once seen as the leader in democratic transition stepped back in the
1990s, what could be one of Nazarbayev’s means to stay at the power. Having
banned oppositionist leaders from running both in presidential and parliamentary
elections the President secured his place at least till 2006, when next presidential
elections are to be held. The West having seen that Kazakhstan could easily
change its destiny from democratic to authoritarian one, begin to stress the need
for real democratic transition, what could be seen from recent “bombardment” of
both international organisations’ and America’s high officials. What could be the
future perspectives of international pressure for further democratisation in
Kazakhstan is to be discussed in the next part.
                                                          
145 For more information see the Website [http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/kazahstan/html]
146 See his recent speeches at the Website [http://www.president.kz]
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CHAPTER III
 FUTURE PROSPECTS
What kind of future Kazakhstan going to be faced with? Democratic or
authoritarian? What should be done in order to successfully complete democratic
transition and begin democratic consolidation? Let us examine possible three
future prospects of the country and make some suggestions on what should be
done to democratize the Kazakhstani society. It should be noted here that, as it
was mentioned above, the presidential preference is very important for
Kazakhstan since the country’s political system limits other sources of power at
the expense of increasing those of the president. Therefore, I think, mainly the
presidential policies will determine the future of the democracy in Kazakhstan.
3.1 An Authoritarian State
First scenario envisions Kazakhstan to preserving its authoritarian status.
Kazakhstani President would be re-elected in 2006 presidential elections and
would be in office till 2013. Main opposition activists would be able to raise their
voices only from abroad. Although the economy would become dependant on oil
incomes, particularly after 2010 when almost all pipelines would begin to
function, considerable economic growth could be expected. Elections would
continue to be criticised by international organisations for their brutal human
rights violations. Existing political parties would be used for masking
authoritarian form of ruling. Some international organisations such as OCSE may
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annul membership of Kazakhstan due to insufficient reforms aimed at democratic
transition.
This scenario does not seem to draw a realistic future. Although some
parts of the population, particularly the old generation, may support such
authoritarianism since it would suit their mentality shaped by totalitarian regime,
large masses would oppose such regime, therefore, mass repression may begin.
Short-term ethnic stability could cause long-term hostility based on ethnic
particularities since the majority of political elite would be Kazakhs, whereas
minorities would be under-represented in all stages of decision making.
Moreover, such developments in political arena may lead to isolation of
Kazakhstan from the Western democratic societies. The end of the regime is not
hard to predict if remind Sukharto’s overthrown in Indonesia.
3.2 A Democratic State
Second scenario is that the President would fully support democratic transition.
He would annul 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections due to OSCE
Reports which suggested to annul the elections (See above) and invite newly
elected parliament to make amendments to the Constitution. Before the elections
“Election Law” would be changed and all Majilis deputies would be elected from
party lists. Opposition would not be repressed any more, and some opposition
activists abroad would be invited to make a democratic pact. Decentralisation
would take place and all Akims would be elected by the locals.
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However, full-scale democratization may lead to extreme consequences.
Liberalization never practised before by large masses would result in anarchy.
Russian population of the North Kazakhstan may demand autonomy since in
some northern regions Russians represent the majority. What is more, activities of
national groups like Slavs’ “LAD” and Kazakhs’ “Alash” consciously or
unconsciously may cause to conflicts on nationalistic grounds, therefore,
possibility of civil war may arise. Economy may collapse since many groups
would interfere in economic affairs at the same time.
3.3 The Middle Way
After focusing on some positive and negative sides of two extremes, both of
which seem to be unrealistic considering the existing conditions in Kazakhstan,
third, middle-of-the-road, way may be considered as possible future perspective
of the Kazakh Republic.
It seems more likely that Kazakhstan would choose the middle way
avoiding extreme situations. I arrived at such a conclusion after having analysed
recent developments and annual speeches of the President (since he has been the
main determinant of Kazakhstani way towards democracy or authoritarianism). In
his annual speech in 1997 the President introduced the program – long term
development strategy “Kazakhstan-2030” where policies concerning the future
development of Kazakhstan till the year 2030 were defined. Seven long-term
tasks were determined:
1. National security
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2. Domestic political stability and consolidation of the society
3. Economic growth based on an open market economy with high level
of foreign investments and internal savings
4. Health, education and well-being of Kazakhstani citizens
5. Power resources
6. Infrastructure, more particularly transport and communication
7. Professional state.147
What attracts the attention here is the absence of any implications on establishing
a democratic society in Kazakhstan. Typically for authoritarian state, the political
rights were consciously “forgotten” whereas emphasis was given on social and
economic well being of the population. This Message (Kazakhstan-2030) is a
clear proof of a tendency of the President towards authoritarian state (the first
scenario), that the President did not see democratization as one of the main tasks.
Two years later the President completely changed his attitude toward the issue:
The main political lesson of the end of XX century consists in
universality of democratization formula. All talks about special type
of democracy are attempts to deviate from democratic principles.
Therefore, we should clearly understand that deviation from
democratization processes is a withdrawal from world tendency, it is the
way to nothing. The direction of movement has been developed by
centuries-old history of democratic societies.148
One analysing the President’s speeches could arrive at such results: (i) the
President looked for suitable moment to announce his commitment to democratic
ideas or (ii) the President changed his mind and became a defender of a
democracy (as a result of some factors). The contradiction between old and recent
ideas of the President could be seen from one of his recent interviews
where he complained about the absence of oppositionist party with alternative
development program, although there were oppositionist groups in the past which
                                                          
147 Full text can be obtained from the Website [www.president.kz]
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prepared even the alternative constitution project, let alone alternative economic
development project, but were not given the chance to explain their ideas to the
public (see previous parts).
Thus what is clear, is that the President 1991-1999 and the President
after 2000 is not the same person in the sense of appropriating democratic values
– the President who was of authoritarian line till 2000, began to stress the need for
democratic development after that time.What are the factors that “motivated “ the
President to change his mind? It was mentioned above, it seems that the President
partly was pressed to announce his commitment to democracy by international
organisations and the USA (see International Factors for details).
Among other factors that play a positive role in choosing democratizing
Kazakhstan, multi-ethnicity of the society should be emphasized. National
minorities would try to have equal rights with the Kazakh majority. It is very
likely that the Kazakhs would tolerate their efforts to make stable multiethnic
society, past relationships and other factors discussed before (see National
Structure) would contribute to such toleration. What is important here, to control
extreme groups, thus preventing them from causing any inter-ethnic conflicts –
here the government of Kazakhstan proved to implement effective politics (see
National Structure).
What should be done to improve the existing situation in the country to
complete democratization process?
                                                                                                                                                             
148 Ibid. (emphasis are original)
110
Firstly, decentralisation of the power. Although this question has been
discussed in Kazakhstan for many years149, concrete steps have not been taken
yet.150 Decentralisation would lead to gaining democratic experiences of the
population, and additionally elected local administrators would bear responsibility
before his or her constituency.
Secondly, new and more liberal law regulating parties and their activities
should be made. It was mentioned above that the existing legal framework,
particularly related with parties and their activities is insufficient to provide their
proper functioning. For example, the need for three thousand members to
establish a new party as well as the small number of seats in the Majilis allocated
to party lists could not be characterised as promoting efficient multi-party system
in the country. Therefore, new law on parties and their activities are needed to
establish really liberal and multi-party system.
Thirdly, civil society which is seen as a means of establishing democracy
in a country contributing to pluralism151 needs to be developed. Thus every
country attempting to establish a democratic society has to have plenty of civil
society organisations which would lead to a democratisation of a country “from
below”.
                                                          
149 The official opinion was that Northern oblasts with the Russian majority are very “sensitive” to
the so-called Russian issue, ie to being discriminated as a minority in Kazakhstan. Therefore, this
“sensitivity” may pave the way to separatist ideas and even deeds.
150 Recently, the President issued the Decree “On Local Elections” which determined the time for
holding the experimental elections of local administrators as Autumn 2001 where only two Akims
of small villages are to be elected from each oblast. The Decree is full of doubtful rules. For
example, Akims will be elected by indirect rule, ie the population of particular village will choose
from 15 to 50 representatives (a number is determined by the Central Election Committee) who
will then vote in the elections of local Akims.
151 Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan and Lipset, Martin. (eds.) 1995. Politics in Developing Countries.
(2nd ed.) London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 27.
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Fourthly, economic achievements should be reflected on the population.
It is proven that economic prosperity and democratization are interrelated.
Obviously, democratic issues will not be taken as of primarily importance in a
country where more than 60 percent of the population live under the line of
poverty. Only after implementing successful economic program that will improve
the living conditions of the masses one could discuss democracy.152 Economic
growth reflected on the population would undoubtedly have positive effect on
democratisation of the country.153
                                                                                                                                                             
152 There is saying in Kazakh “A hungry child does not play with the full one” which could be
applied to the case of Kazakhstan before Western democracies.
153 GDP raised by 10 percent in 2000. This tendency is continuing this year too. Last year
pensions and wages of teachers, doctors and those of other budgetary organisations (except of
civil servants) were raised by 30-40 percent. However, these steps seem to be insufficient.
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CONCLUSION
Kazakhstani way towards establishing democratic society has a short history, that
could be divided into three phases: 1) introduction of democratic ideas (1991-
1995), 2) authoritarianism (1995-1999) and 3) moderate authoritarianism (1999 –
till present).
Although there were some societal transformations in the late 1980s,
democratic ideas were introduced to Kazakhstani society at the beginning of
1990s – with gaining independence as a result of the collapse of the USSR. First
years of democratic experience were associated with massive state-building
process, formation of political parties, NGOs. First parliament of independent
Kazakhstan elected in 1994 could be a school of democracy for political elite of
the new independent country since tried to play a role of check and balances in
the political system where strong presidency began making its first steps
preferring a system with parliamentarian authority. But the cost of opposing
presidential policies was high: the Parliament was dissolved in March 1995.
The year of 1995 symbolised a year of slowing down democratic
transformations. Firstly, the 1994 parliamentary elections were annulled, and the
Parliament was dissolved. Secondly, 1993 Constitution that envisioned a balanced
political system was said to be ineffective and inapplicable to the existing
situation. Thirdly, as a consequence of “ineffectiveness” of 1993 Constitution, a
draft of a new one – that envisioned semi-presidential system where a president
would be the main actor – was drawn and put on national referendum. Thus the
political system was completely changed and the new bicameral parliament
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became an inefficacious legislature without significant power. As a result of these
developments in the area of the political, Kazakhstani status related with the
exercising of political and civil liberties was decreased from “partly free” to “not
free”, ie Kazakhstan obviously began to step back in the issue of democratic
transition.
The mid of 1990s was passed under the banner of unofficial political
repression of the opposition. Main opposition activist, former Prime Minister
Akezhan Kazhegeldin left the country fearing of being sentenced and prisoned for
his political views. Others were sent abroad being appointed as ambassadors (eg
Olzhas Suleimenov to Italy, Mukhtar Shakhanov to Kyrgyzstan, Baltash
Tursumbayev to Turkey) or were appointed to important positions in the state
apparatus. Some newspapers of oppositionist line were closed. Opposition proved
to be unorganised and financially weak to propagandise its views. Political parties
lacked mass support.
The end of 1990s was a peak of authoritarianism. The Presidential
election of 1999 was nothing but a bad-masked play of free elections. Main
oppositionist candidates were denied registration to participate in the election.
The same scenario was practised in 1999 parliamentary elections. RPP decided
not to participate since registration of its leader Akezhan Kazhegeldin was
rejected by the Central Election Committee. Several international organisations
criticised both presidential and parliamentary elections for political rights’
violations.
However, the situation was changed by Nursultan Nazarbayev’s
announced commitment to democracy in one of his late annual speeches
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(although he touched the problematic of a democracy first time in his 1998 annual
speech– but we could characterise his speech of 1998 as experimental one
directed to learn people’s attitudes towards the matter). Nazarbayev, who did not
mention establishment of the democratic society even in the long-term
development strategy “Kazakhstan-2030”, accepted the universality of democratic
ideas (according to his speeches). The President who did not tolerate any kind of
opposition in the past began to speak about opposition “of a good quality”
(kachestvennaiia oppositziia). It seems that international actors such as
international organisations and Western states among other factors have played
the main role in changing Nazarbayev’s ideas on democratisation of the
Kazakhstani society. The opposition has begun to speak about possible early
general elections dated for Summer 2002 and even of possible early resignation of
the President.154 According to some analysts of Kazakhstani politics the President
will not try to be re-elected in the next presidential elections dated for December
2006.155 Therefore, Kazakhstani political system could completely change after
the new presidential elections establishing really democratic state.
The Kazakhstani way towards democratic society has been full of steps
forward and backward. For many years the main task for Nazarbayev has been
rapid economic development and stability in the society; democracy has been
considered as of second importance until recent years. But, at least at theoretical
level, it seems that things have begun to change. Many things have to be done in
order to come close to a democracy as was defined in Introduction. Although
                                                          
154 For more information see the Website of the Kazakhstani opposition [www.eurasia.org.ru]
155 For views of Kazhegeldin and other opposition activists see [www.eurasia.org.ru/cgi-eurasia/r-
test.pl?analitica]
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there are very little signs in the practise, one could surely expect that the
establishment of a democratic society would not be a dream for Kazakhstan in the
near future.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A.  Distribution of  Kazakhstani Population by Selected Nationalities
(according to the results of the population censuses of corresponding years)
Nationalities Population, thousand people 1989 1999
1959 1970 1979 Thou-
sand
people
Share in
total
popula-
tion (%)
Thou-
sand
people
Share in
total
popula-
tion (%)
Total
population,
Of whom
9313,3 13013,0 14688,3
16199,
2 100,0 14953,1 100,0
Kazakhs 2798,4 4238,4 5293,4 6496,9 40,1 7985,0 53,4
Russians 3974,2 5521,9 5991,2 6062,0 37,4 4479,6 30,0
Ukrainians 762,1 933,5 898,0 875,7 5,4 547,1 3,7
Uzbeks 136,6 216,3 263,3 331,0 2,0 370,7 2,5
Germans 659,8 858,1 900,2 946,9 5,8 353,4 2,4
Tatars 191,9 285,7 312,6 320,7 2,0 249,0 1,7
Uygurs 59,8 120,9 147,9 181,5 1,1 210,4 1,4
Belarussians 107,5 198,3 181,5 177,9 1,1 111,9 0,75
Koreans 74,0 81,6 92,0 100,7 0,62 99,7 0,67
Azerbaijanis 38,4 57,7 73,3 89,0 0,55 78,3 0,52
Turks 9,9 18,5 25,8 49,5 0,31 75,9 0,51
Poles 53,1 61,4 61,1 59,4 0,37 47,3 0,32
Dungans 10,0 17,3 22,5 30,0 0,18 36,9 0,25
Kurds 6,1 12,3 17,7 25,4 0,16 32,8 0,22
Chechens 130,2 34,5 38,3 49,1 0,30 31,8 0,21
Tajiks 8,1 16,0 19,3 25,3 0,16 25,7 0,17
Bashkirs 8,7 21,4 32,5 40,9 0,25 23,2 0,16
Moldavians 14,8 26,0 30,3 32,4 0,20 19,5 0,13
Ingushs 47,9 18,4 18,3 19,5 0,12 16,9 0,11
Mordvins 25,5 34,4 31,4 29,2 0,18 16,1 0,11
Armenians 9,3 12,8 14,0 18,5 0,11 14,8 0,10
Greeks 55,5 51,2 49,9 46,3 0,29 12,7 0,08
Chuvashs 11,3 22,9 22,3 21,7 0,13 11,9 0,08
Kyrgyzs 6,8 9,6 9,4 13,7 0,08 10,9 0,07
Udmurts 3,9 15,8 15,5 15,5 0,10 9,1 0,06
Lithuanians 12,1 14,2 11,0 10,7 0,07 7,1 0,05
Bulgarians 12,2 10,4 10,1 10,2 0,06 6,9 0,05
Jews 28,1 27,0 22,8 17,5 0,11 6,7 0,04
Maris 2,1 9,1 10,6 11,9 0,07 6,5 0,04
Georgians 3,5 6,9 7,7 9,0 0,06 5,4 0,04
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Gypsies 7,3 7,8 8,6 7,1 0,04 5,1 0,03
Lezgins 3,3 2,6 6,1 13,8 0,09 4,6 0,03
Chineses 3,2 4,2 3,7 3,6 0,02 3,5 0,02
Persians 3,9 3,0 2,9 3,1 0,02 2,9 0,02
Meskhetenia
n Turks
… … … … … 2,8 0,02
Balkars 4,2 2,7 2,3 2,9 0,02 2,1 0,01
Ossetians 2,1 3,5 4,0 4,2 0,03 2,0 0,01
Estonians 3,7 4,1 3,5 3,3 0,02 1,8 0,01
Latvians 4,6 4,3 4,3 3,3 0,02 1,8 0,01
Turkmens 1,3 3,3 2,2 3,7 0,02 1,7 0,01
Kara-
kalpaks
0,3 0,5 0,6 1,4 0,01 1,5 0,01
Avars … 1,0 1,6 2,7 0,02 1,4 0,01
Karachains 5,6 2,4 2,1 2,0 0,01 1,4 0,01
Crimean
Tatars
… 2,0 0,8 3,1 0,02 1,0 0,01
      
Source: The Report of the Agency of Republic of the Kazakhstan on Statistics, on
http://www.kazstat.asdc.kz/indexe.htm
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Appendix B. Kazakhstani parties participated in the 1999 parliamentary elections
1. Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK)
CPK, which was unofficially established in October 1991 by those who
did not agree with decision of renaming the party into socialist one, was officially
registered on February 28, 1994 and re-registered in 1997. It has departments in
all regions of the Republic and some 55 thousands party members. Membership
consists mainly of representatives of scientific intelligentsia, civil servants,
workers, and pensioners.
CPK published the newspaper “Trudovaya Zhizn” (Working life) from
1995 to May 1997 when the National Agency on Press and Mass Media abolished
its license due to the violation of some articles of Law of Press. CPK has close
contacts with the Communist Party of Russian Federation, the Union of
Communist Parties and other Communist Organizations of NIS Countries, the
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, Worker’s movement, “Azamat” and “Pokolenye”.
In February 1998 it supported formation of the “People’s Front of Kazakhstan”.
Main sources of financing are membership fees and donations.
Primary goal of the CPK can be summarised as establishment of the
society based on the principles of scientific socialism. In political arena the CPK
struggles for restoration of Soviets and establishment of parliamentary republic.
In social and economic fields – restoration of the socialist type of ownership
(private and state owned property and their combination); intolerance of
exploitation of people; return to planned management of national property;
suspension of privatisation; restoration of social guarantees that were provided by
Soviet regime: right to labor, rest, lodgings, free health-care and education.
Despite the fact that CPK recognises parliamentary methods of struggle
for power, at the same time, it uncompromisingly opposes official political
course. Main methods of CPK are ideological, political, scientific-methodic and
organisational work with population.
Ex-chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Serikbolsyn Abdildin is the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPK.
CPK’s slate for 1999 elections to Majilis was headed by Serikbolsyn
Abdildin, born 1937, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPK, Head
of Department at Kazakh State Agrarian University and Boris Sorokin, advisor of
the first secretary of CK CPK.
The CPK has three members in the Majilis.
Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan.
Agrarian Party is a new political formation on the Kazakhstani political
map. Its Constituent Congress was held on January 6, 1999 in Astana - new
capital of Kazakhstan. The program of this party defines follows as party’s
primary goals: introduction of private ownership on land, improvement of rural
infrastructure; decrease of taxes etc. One of the main goals of the party was
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successful participation in the parliamentary elections of 1999. According to
Chairman of the Agrarian party Madinov, “…Agrarian Party shall be a
conservative political force, opposing revolutionary changes and interested in
political stability”. Before the election campaign began the party was not very
active, but during the campaign – in very short period of time – it established a
number of branches in the regions of the Republic and was registered by the
Ministry of Justice. Although it was established just before the 1999 elections, it
succeeded in sending three members to the Majilis
Republican political party "OTAN" (Fatherland)
“Otan” was formed in December 1998. Party was officially registered on
February 12, 1999. The so-called “uniting” Congress of “Otan” took place on
March 1, 1999 in Almaty, where “Otan” united with several parties which
announced their dissolution such as the Party of National Unity of Kazakhstan,
the Democratic Party, Liberal Movement of Kazakhstan and "For Kazakhstan –
2030" Movement. According to its leaders, “Otan” has roughly 126,5 thousands
members and branches in all regions of the country. Its position is loyal to official
policy.
Although the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Nursultan
Nazarbayev – was elected a Chairman at the "uniting" Congress, he delegated
powers to ex-Prime Minister Sergei Tereschenko.
Well-known public figures, scientists, businessmen are among party
members.
Nowadays “Otan” has 24 members in the Lower House of the
Kazakhstani Parliament.
Party "People’s Congress of Kazakhstan" (PCK)
One of the first parties created by Nazarbayev – PCK was established on
October 5, 1991, officially registered by the Ministry of Justice on December 3,
1991, and re-registered on December 12, 1995. It has branches in all regions of
the Republic except Western Kazakhstan. The number of its members is reported
as about 30,000. Social base of the party consists mainly of scientists, artistic
intelligentsia, and businessmen. Till 1996 PCK owned two newspapers: "National
Congress" and "Halyk Congresi" that had circulation of 40 thousands in total;
both were closed due to financial problems. Main sources of financing are
membership fees, donations and revenues from economic activity.
Main goal of PCK today is establishment of a democratic society. In
social and economic spheres PCK promotes gradual privatisation of state property
including land; development of agrarian sector, food and construction industries.
1994 marked change of the party’s political orientation from loyal party to
constructive opposition. However, at its 3rd Congress (October 14, 1995) PCK
changed its political line once more, now from constructive opposition to
constructive collaboration with state authorities. Now position of PCK is that of
rather passive and loyal direction.
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Well-known political activist and famous poet Olzhas Suleimenov has
been the Chairman of PCK from its foundation. In connection with Suleimenov’s
appointing as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of
Kazakhstan to Italy in March 1996, Anvar Ismailov – one of the Suleimenov’s
deputies – has temporarily acted as a Chairman since then.
PCK has two members in the Majilis.
Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RPP)
It was found on December 17, 1998 and registered by the Ministry of
Justice on March 1, 1999. At the moment of registration, membership of RPP
accounted for 3,100 people. According to unconfirmed data party has its branches
in all regions of the Republic. Main decision-making body of the party is the
Congress. The Executive Committee carries out everyday activity of RPP.
According to the party program, its primary goals include establishment
of a democratic state with market economy, improvement of quality of life of
population by implementing radical political and economic reforms. RPP stays in
“hard” opposition to official policy. The party has three newspapers: “XXI
Century”, “451 Fahrenheit”, and “Sol Dat”
Ex-Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin is the Chairman of the RPP.
Former Co-chairman of the Socialist party of Kazakhstan Gaziz Aldamzharov is
the Deputy Chairman and the Head of the Executive Committee.
At the last parliamentary elections well-known political scientist
Nurbulat Masanov, film producer Rashid Nugmanov, and popular journalist
Sergei Duvanov headed party slate of RPP.
The Central Electoral Commission denied registration of Akezhan
Kazhegeldin. The rest of the party leaders preferred to be registered as candidates
for single-mandate electoral districts.
RPP has only one member in the Majilis elected from single-mandate
electoral district.
“Revival Party” of Kazakhstan (RPK)
RPK was found on January 27, 199, and registered on September 20,
1995. The party has branches in all regions of the country with about 5,000
members – mainly teachers, doctors, scientists, artists, administrators, engineers,
businessmen and students. RPK publishes monthly magazine “Amazonka” (in
Russian, circulation 17,000). Republican and regional state-owned newspapers
such as “Kazakhstanskaya Pravda” and “Vechernii Almaty” provide propaganda
services and information on its activity. Main sources of financing are
membership fees and revenues from magazine publication.
RPK promotes moral and spiritual revival of the society, creation of civil
society and rule of law, and socially oriented economy. The party also struggles
for providing women with opportunities for active participation in political life. In
social and economic spheres it supports policies of defending the population from
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inflation, increase of production, of developing export potential of the country, of
providing social guarantees for indigent citizens, etc. In the political arena RPK is
totally on the side of reforms that have been implemented by the President and
Government.
Writer Altynshash Zhaganova is the Chairwoman of RPK.
 
Democratic party “Azamat”
Party “Azamat was found on March 27 1999 on the base of “Azamat”
movement and registered by the Ministry of Justice.
The party’s membership includes civil servants, representatives of
scientific and artistic intelligentsia, owners of small business, non-political and
non-governmental organizations. “Azamat” has not its own newspaper or
magazine, therefore, uses such mass media means as newspapers “XXI Century”,
“Caravan”, Commercial TV channel and others. Main sources of financing are
donations.
In political arena “Azamat” promotes formation of a multi-party system,
increase of parliamentary powers over governmental activities. “Azamat”
supports introduction of self-government in villages, towns and cities with
executive and representative bodies, with their own property and budget; total
independence of courts from executive branch etc.
In economic and social spheres “Azamat” acts against giving control
over key objects of national economy to small international companies; for de-
monopolisation of banking system and for decreasing number of taxes,
simplification of tax collection process; supports national producers, small and
medium business enterprises, social guarantees.
At the beginning “Azamat” was among the parties of “hard” opposition.
Initiative of formation of opposition bloc called "People’s Front of Kazakhstan"
belonged to the leaders of “Azamat” movement. “Azamat” had cooperated with
Worker’s movement, "Pokolenye" movement, and the Communist Party of
Kazakhstan. On December 11, 1998 leaders of "Azamat" movement made an
unexpected for majority of observers statement “On political situation before
presidential elections and perspectives of development of democratic processes in
Kazakhstan". In this statement co-chairmen of “Azamat” criticised their former
allies – communists and Kazhegeldin’s group and expressed their wish to make a
constructive dialogue with any president that would be elected including
Nursultan Nazarbaev.
Former Deputy Prime Minister Galym Abilseitov is the Chairman of
“Azamat”. He headed the slate of “Azamat” together with Murat Auezov, and
businessman Platon Pak. Former Minister, one of the leaders of “Azamat”, Petr
Svoik preferred to be registered as a candidate from single-mandate electoral
district.
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National party “Alash”
“Alash” was formed on the base of Republican Party of Kazakhstan.
Party was officially registered during spring of 1999. It has branches in 9 regions.
According to party leaders, party currently has 10 thousand members.
Its members are representatives of rural population and those of
scientific and artistic intelligentsia of Kazakh origin. “Alash” has no own press
organ and uses republican and local mass media in Kazakh language for
propaganda and informing the population about party activities. Main source of
financing – donations of activists.
Main goal of the party is revival of the Kazakh nation, unification of
national-patriotic forces in order to create a democratic society. “Alash” is the
only nationalistic party and reflects interests of the Kazakh population and mainly
supports economic reforms and policies have implemented by the President and
Government. However, ”Alash” does not cooperate with other parties and
movements.
Sabetqazy Akatai is the Chairman of the party.
Republican Political Labor Party (RPLP)
The party was formed on the base of people’s movement "Union of
Engineers of Kazakhstan" on September 18, 1995 and received official
registration on January 10, 1996. It has branches in 8 regions of the country.
According to its leaders the party has 18,900 members, who are mainly
representatives of scientific and technical intelligentsia. Press organ of the party is
The Newsletter of Engineering Academy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is
published once a year with circulation of 400. Main sources of financing are
membership fees and donations.
Main goal of the party – expressing interests of intelligentsia through
passing corresponding laws. RPLP promotes democratic and humanistic values,
stressing the priority of human rights, equality of opportunities, political pluralism
and absence of any ideological monopoly. Party supports governmental policies.
The Chairman of the Republican Political Labor Party is Bahytzhan
Zhumagulov, who at the same time acts as the President of Engineering Academy
of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Representation of RPLP: 10 Members in the Majilis, 5 – in the Senate.
Civil Party
The party was found on November 17, 1998 and was registered
by the Ministry of Justice later.
 According to its leaders, the party was initiated by collectives of
some metallurgic and mining enterprises. Actually, it unites managers of
mining enterprises and those of financial groups.
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As its main goal the Civil Party considers increase of production,
increase of welfare, strengthening of the country’s sovereignty. Party is
loyal to the President.
Deputy General Director of Pavlodar Alumina Production Plant
Azat Peruashev is the First Secretary of the party’s Central Committee.
The party has 11 representatives in the Majilis.
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